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Note: When speaking in an exemplary manner about a certain individual's actions, reactions or  
inclinations, I will use the gender neutral pronoun “their”, rather than using “he or she” (or “his or 
her” respectively” or alternating between “he” and “she” (“his” / “her”)1.
1 c.f. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46ehrFk-gLk for a brief discussion of the advantages of using ‘they’ 
rather than gender specific pronouns in English.
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1 Introduction
“In the Spring of the year 1924 the young German physicist Werner Heisenberg went on a 
walking tour with the great Niels Bohr in Denmark, Bohr's homeland. The following is 
Heisenberg's account of what Bohr said when they came to Kronberg Castle. 'Isn't it strange 
how this castle changes as soon as one imagines that Hamlet lived here. As scientists we 
believe that a castle consists only of stones, and admire the way the architect put them 
together. The stone, the green roof with its patina, the wood carvings in the church, 
constitute the whole castle. None of this should be changed by the fact that Hamlet lived 
here, and yet it is changed completely. Suddenly the walls and the ramparts speak a different 
language. The courtyard becomes an entire world, a dark corner reminds us of the darkness of 
the human soul, we hear Hamlet's "To be or not to be." Yet all we really know about Hamlet is 
that his name appears in a thirteenth-century chronicle. No one can prove that he really lived 
here. But everyone knows the questions Shakespeare had him ask, the human depths he was 
made to reveal, and so he too had to be found a place on earth, here in Kronberg.’”2
In the fall of 2013 I traveled down the west coast of Turkey from Istanbul to zmir. On the way Iİzmir. On the way I  
got to visit three significant archaeological sites of ancient Greek culture, which in those times  
extended well into Asia Minor. Those were Troy, Pergamon, and Ephesus. All three were interesting  
and distinct from one another in a multitude of ways, but it was one glaring difference between  
Troy and Ephesus in particular that eventually lead me to write this thesis. This difference lies in 
the way both sites presented their past, that is, how palpable the histories that they were attempt-
ing to tell felt to me, their visitor.
Troy is fundamentally an archaeological site with relatively little padding of historical interpre-
tation, which in itself is mostly located outside of the actual site. The premises of Troy themselves  
are accessible via roped-off paths from which one can see little more than ancient brickwork that 
protrudes from the ground, and occasional pieces of stone columns and cuboids, both often with  
ornaments.  Not one ‘Troy’,  but nine settlements bearing that name, were built on top of one  
another over the course of 3,500 years, which makes it impossible to entirely lay open either of  
these without destroying the ones on top of it. The nature of on-site information reflects this situ-
ation: The visitor gets little more than signs stuck into the ground, marking the respective layer of 
settlement with Roman numerals from I to IX,  and occasional boards with extensive paragraphs of  
text about e.g. a particular building technique or the Schliemann Trench. The former did impart  
hardly any understanding of Troy to me, the layman visitor, and were more confusing than any-
how helpful, while the latter proved to be quite hard to parse both due to the volume and rela -
tively abstract nature of the information given, and no apparent connection between one and the  
next. In short, there was no apparent effort to guide the visitor through the premises as a whole in  
a coherent fashion. Granted, doing so is no easy feat when there is very little visible material to  
work with, and with the nine layers creating a kind of historical flip image in the same space.3 
2 Bruner 1984, 45
3 The one place in Troy where those layers can actually be seen in relation to each other is a trench that 
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Those shortcomings, however, could also bear the opportunity to highlight the tension between 
history and the past by marking the ‘interpretedness’  of any history one could tell,  especially 
against the backdrop of the multiple ‘pasts’ that are competing with one another in Troy.
Ephesus affords an entirely different experience. The site is in a much better condition over all,  
and no (apparent) layers of settlements are blocking access to or hiding one another. Even though 
more easily digestible historical information was available on boards in and around the buildings 
and via an audio guide, Ephesus was big and visually impressive enough for me to wander around 
without having to actually absorb that information: It seemed to invite the mind to compose its  
own ideas and stories, or take them from whatever medial source one might have been exposed  
to, just to graft them onto the substrate of a place that still seems to be “evocative of its former  
life.”4 Ephesus is not just dug up but restored to a considerable degree. Even though the restora-
tion was done employing the technique of anastylosis,  in which original elements are used as  
much as possible and substitute components are visibly distinguishable as such, it does not miti-
gate the very immediate impression that what one sees is ‘how it must have been’.
I do probably still ‘know’ more about Troy, not because of the information on site but thanks to  
two students of history who were with me and managed to puzzle together a more coherent pic -
ture of the past. Ephesus however has many more vivid images attached to it, and has overall left  
a greater impression to this day. It seemed to me that while Troy was lacking the means to convey 
historical knowledge of its past (as histories) to visitors in a compelling way, in Ephesus the com -
pelling impressions and emergent stories were abundant, but at the expense of a clear distinction 
between those and the uninterpreted past.
Neither situation was satisfactory to me; neither could be chosen as the ‘greater good’ or the 
‘lesser evil’ over the other. The question I started asking myself was whether there is a way to con -
vey historical knowledge more effectively over all, by harnessing the strengths of both sites with-
out also admitting their weaknesses. To to so effectively, all the elements that are at play in con-
veying history to a non-scholarly audience would have to be taken into unreserved consideration. 
It seemed to me, however, that those elements were mutually weakening, if not excluding one 
another: The presentation should be compelling, but not merely entertaining; it should present a 
faithful interpretation of the past and convince the recipient of it exactly to the degree that it can  
be scholarly defended. To do so, it should not just captivate the senses, nor resort to the historian’s  
authority, but provide an opening for critical reflection – all without losing its more immediately 
Heinrich Schliemann dug “to explore the Mound of Troy in the 1870”. It is exactly that exercise which (for me) 
made the past of Troy more palpable, which is widely disapproved of in modern times, “in the process 
Schliemann ’destroyed a phenomenal amount of material’” (Stokes 2005).
4 Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Ephesus”, (accessed 2018-10-22), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ephesus&oldid=864076918
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sensory and aesthetic appeal.
In short, the three criteria of conveying history that should be achieved simultaneously are  
verisimilitude,  veracity,  and  verifiability.  I  am by  no means  the  first  to  have  this  realization. 
Approaches to this topic have been made from many different angles, but could be sorted into 
two broad methodological categories: First, those descriptively examining some of the aforemen-
tioned elements at play, i.e. with an interest in answering what works and why in a theoretical and 
reflective manner. Second, those practical efforts which seek to explore  how to convey history 
practically in an experimental and incremental manner, based on heuristics and educated guesses. 
This thesis is an attempt to draw together insights and theories mostly generated by the former 
group of methodologies so as to answer the questions typically stated in the latter. It is theory  
crafting, motivated by an application-oriented perspective. As such, it also attempts to contribute 
to integrating the academic fields which are only loosely joined in my study program of European 
Heritage, Digital Media, and The Information Society, and simultaneously offer more exhaustive 
answers than any of those disciplines could provide on its own. Since the three stated criteria do  
at least stand in some tension to one another, exhaustive answers are also needed to prevent  
inadvertent precedence of one or two over the other(s).
My own academic and professional background lies in software development, media studies, 
and game design.  My particular  academic interest  focused on interactive narratives  and aug-
mented reality, which was reflected in the initial research question of this thesis: “How can story -
telling by means of interactive narratives be employed to convey a meaningful interpretation of 
the past?” Only halfway into the thesis will I have gathered the vocabulary to reformulate it in a  
more precise manner: “What are the desired semiotic qualities (of any given medium) to effec-
tively convey or facilitate a veracious interpretation of the past?”
This thesis consists of six chapters. After the introduction, chapter two will briefly present the 
practice that scholars of history use to create an understanding of the past, and the challenges  
and  necessary  shortcomings  that  arise  when  attempting  to  directly  transfer  this  practice  to 
another medium which by necessity operates under different rules. It will establish more precisely 
which questions will have to be answered for the effort of this thesis, and reject some answers  
that will shown to be unsatisfactory. Chapter three will then discuss narrative as the mode of  
understanding for both historiography as well as everyday life. It will highlight its problems, but  
argue that narrative is,  for philosophical and psychological reasons, a necessary, effective, and 
ultimately redeemable modus operandi for historical inquiry as well as conveyance of history. Hav-
ing thus preliminarily established narrative as a means suitable for the effort of this thesis, I will  
discuss the modalities of its ‘implementation’ in chapter four. The inextricable relation between  
the structure, conveyance and reception of medial information will be analyzed by intersecting 
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two ontologies of media. Special emphasis will be given to nonlinear and interactive media, as  
those are more recent forms which are more likely to yield new pathways for the conveyance of  
history. Chapter five will then argue that multimedial interactive narration has the capacity to 
facilitate a medial reception which does in fact allow for the three aforementioned criteria of 
verisimilitude, veracity, and verifiability. Specific conditions which have to be met, and some tools 
to do so, will be laid out there.
I will intersperse this thesis with perspectives on how the theoretical frameworks I am presenting  
relate to, and how my findings could be applied to, the sites of Troy and Ephesus. They could be  
regarded as ‘theoretical case studies’. To provide more contrast, and partially also to forego the 
hazard of just intersecting theory with practice where it happens to be most opportune, I will use  
one more case study: The German Emigration Center.
The German Immigration Center has taken on that task of bridging the gap between verisimili-
tude, veracity, and verifiability so as to mediate history effectively, but under fundamentally dif-
ferent circumstances than Troy and Ephesus: Not being limited by the physical properties of an 
ancient archaeological site, it was built with the liberty to design the visitor’s whole experience  
from start to finish. Even though it is located in Bremerhaven in Northern Germany, a harbor city  
from which more people embarked to the New World than from anywhere else in Germany, it  
does not exhibit a place, but the history of German emigration over all. It achieves this by leading  
the visitor through that part of the emigration story which is common to everyone who left for  
the New World between the early 1800s and 1930s: Arriving in the harbor city from all over Ger-
many and other parts of Europe, embarking on a ship, spending weeks at sea, arriving at an immi-
grant inspection station, and then dispersing to the different parts of the respective country.
The details  and circumstances of those  stories  did vary profoundly depending on the time 
period, class, and destination of the particular emigrant. Therefore the different rooms, or objects  
within rooms, all represent one particular context authentically and often immersively, but are  
always contrasted with either dissimilar historical impressions, or more general and abstract infor-
mation. For example, in the harbor ‘room’ (see Illustration 1) an overall authentic looking scene is 
contrasted with audio stations where one can listen to general (and therefore detached) historical  
information, but also the word "Abschied" (leave/farewell) written on the wall, which is of course 
totally inauthentic, but still serves to evoke or draw on the visitor’s own emotions.
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The admission ticket also doubles as a so-called iCard, a plastic card equipped with an RFID chip  
(radio frequency identification), through which one (actual) emigrant’s story can be accessed at  
different stations throughout the exhibition. This way the visitors can easily emphasize with one 
particular emigrant’s perspective without fully assuming their role.
This oscillation between immersive experience and reflection reached very much the goal which  
I also aspired to, but at the time of me visiting Troy and Ephesus I could not precisely analyze the  
German Emigration Center’s methods, nor formulate why it achieves these effects, even though 
(to my uninformed mind) it clearly seemed to do so.
2 Intersecting historical epistemologies and digital games
By using one exemplary proposal made by Clyde et. al. in their paper “Beyond the 'Historical' Sim-
ulation: Using Theories of History to Inform Scholarly Game Design,” I will attempt to lay out the  
generally accepted practice that historians use to create 'history', as well as a directly (naively)  
derived approach to transfer this practice into creating history by means of video games: With 
what they call  the  gamic mode of history, defined as “the construction of scholarly historical 
arguments as scholarly games,”5 they claim to have found a way to reproduce the textual means 
of creating an account of the past (i.e. one 'history') in the medium of video games. The first prop-
erty of such an account, if it is to claim any veracity, is that it has to convey an argument about 
5 Clyde et. al. 2012, 2, emphasis mine
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Illustration 1: Harbor scene with mannequins in historical clothing from different decades of the 19th 
century and the word "Abschied" (leave/farewell) on the wall
the past, one which “consists of facts that are converted to evidence and arranged according to a 
set of rules for that particular argument via interpretation”6 rather than just “of an appeal to 
rhetoric.”7 While the authors assert that those goals will have to be met in different ways depend-
ing on the medium, they insist that their approach must not leave any room for any (unintended) 
“sense of veracity outside of the arrangement of evidence and interpretation of the argument.”8
The underlying motivation to guide the interpretation of a historical narrative's recipient so 
rigidly  is  derived  from  the  authors'  preference  for  one  of  the  three  broad  epistemological 
approaches to historical scholarship that Alun Munslow calls  construction,  deconstruction,  and 
reconstruction:
Deconstructionism is the approach which bases “the individuals [sic] understandings on their 
own experience of the evidence or arguments.”9 In other words, while facts and arguments are 
presented to the reader of the narrative, they don't come bundled with the 'instructions' for the  
one (at least in the respective context) right way to make sense of them. As this suggests “an 
unknowable past, or past that can be known in a multitude of ways,”10 it falls short of Clyde et. 
al.’s expectation of what historical scholarship should achieve. The equation of 'unknowable' and 
knowable 'in a multitude of ways' sheds light on the notion that a truth claim deserving of this 
name can only exist in a context where it and all other such claims about the same matter are 
mutually exclusive. The notion that there is no, and cannot be, any one authority that marks a 
statement as objectively true or false would align this approach to postmodernism in Clyde et. al.’s  
view.
Reconstructionism, then, “attempts to descriptively recreate the past as it actually was through 
the use of sources, which by their nature as facts are objective.”11 Opposed to the deconstruction-
ist approach, its underlying assumption is not only that there can be one correct interpretation of 
the past but that the veracity of this interpretation is linked to the 'thickness' (to borrow Clifford  
Geertz'  term)  of  the  presented  facts.  One  could  even  claim  that  in  this  understanding,  the  
dichotomy between 'history' and 'past' becomes false because it can be bridged: The effort of cre-
ating history is the effort of creating a verbatim 'carbon copy' of the past. Clyde et. al. are missing  
the interpretative guidance of this approach as well, and criticize numerous video games for mak-
ing use of this approach “as though the volume of facts accounted for by their system is directly  









Where  deconstructionism is underserving and  reconstructionism is overserving the purpose, 
the authors present  constructionism as a third way, that which “the vast majority of historians 
practicing today” follow.13 The core difference to the other two epistemologies lies in its regard of 
the connection between the past and history, “analysing how and what individual pieces of evi -
dence can do, and what conclusions [...] can be established through evidence relationships.”14 By 
not only laying out the historical data, which is done by the other epistemological approaches as  
well, but accompanying it with a discussion about the adequate interpretation of such data, they 
provide a demarcation of the exact scope within which it can be comprehended. The assumption is  
that by doing this, the truth claim actually meets the conditions described above.
While there is no reason to doubt that this epistemology will actually produce the most veracious  
accounts of history, and while it might be the only one that lives up to the high standards of his -
torical scholarship, the authors' attempt to translate it to a mode of digital games (said  gamic  
mode) can be objected to in two ways:
First, limiting digital games in such a way that they prevent any unintended interpretation of 
the data presented is a feat not easily accomplished. The authors are aware of this: “In response to 
this characteristic of the medium of games, a gamic mode of history needs to be particularly rig-
orous on the points of evidence and interpretation.”15 Games, to employ a framework laid out by 
Hunicke  et.  al.,  consist  of  a  set  of  rules  (the  mechanics)  which,  by  being executed,  create  a 
dynamic "run-time behavior [...] over time.”16 These dynamics are then interpreted in one way or 
another by the player. It is thus not possible to predict the progression of a particular game ses-
sion (be it digital or not) only from looking at its mechanics. A game whose progression over time 
would be predictable in the way the authors require it to be would cease to be one, as it would  
not provide any options of action to its players, let alone facilitate any self-expression (which is a  




16 Hunicke et. al. 2004, 2
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Illustration 2: Perspectives on the MDA framework (Hunicke et. al. 2004, 2)
In non-digital  games,  say board games,  the players are those agents that execute the game's 
mechanics. Playing such a game is then, by definition, only possible if the players actually know 
the entirety of those mechanics.17 Their role is dichotomous in the sense that they give rise to the 
game's dynamics, while simultaneously receiving that behavior and responding to it emotionally. 
As the game progresses, the players create a narrative of the events in the game, which is exactly  
the point the authors want to avoid: “Narrative is so closely tied to our understanding of action,  
and as history is the study of past action, that if the historian’s prose does not present a cohesive  
narrative to the reader, the reader then creates one.”18
This aspect becomes even more problematical, as Jeremy Antley states, when considering digital 
games, which are “by their very nature, closed constructions whose operation the player cannot, 
on face, intrinsically know or predict without engaging first in a large degree of play.” 19 As a digi-
tal game is executed by a computer – and not the players –, the player can only approximate a full  
understanding of the mechanics (here: algorithms) by interpreting the dynamic behavior which  
unfolds as a response to their actions, but only by the computer's mediation.
One important constraint to these considerations has to be considered at this point. I unwarrant-
edly equated the 'historical narrative' that Clyde et. al. speak of to the player's interpretation of  
any game's dynamics (the aesthetics in the terms of Hunicke et. al). Not every game, be it digital 
or not, facilitates an interpretation of its dynamics as a narrative, or even any kind of interpreta-
tion – in a literary sense – at all. Consider the example of  Janet Murray interpreting the puzzle 
game Tetris20 as
“a perfect enactment of the over tasked lives of Americans in the 1990s – of the constant 
bombardment of tasks that demand our attention and that we must somehow fit into our 
overcrowded schedules and clear off our desks in order to make room for the next 
onslaught.”21
This seems so odd because Murray chooses to interpret the workings of the mere mechanics – and 
Tetris can offer little more than that – as if they alone qualified to convey a meaning beyond the  
frame of the game at its run-time.22 The interpretation is not invalid, just arbitrary.
This thesis will rely on the kinds of games which have some capacity for storytelling, that is to 
say those games whose dynamics can yield something that can be interpreted as ‘narrative’. What  
17 Or if they have otherwise access to them, typically by means of a rulebook.
18 Clyde et. al. 2012, 8
19 Antley 2012
20 Bullet-Proof Software 1989
21 Murray 1997
22 To borrow a distinction by Jesper Juul, Tetris falls into the category of games of emergence, which consist 
of “a small number of rules that combine and yield large numbers of game variations”. Those are opposed to 
games of progression, in which the game designer maintains ”strong control of the sequence of events” (Juul 
2005). “Emergence games have strategy guides” while “progression games have walkthroughs” (Juul 2002).
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this means in detail will be explored throughout the thesis. I am using the term ‘game’ in a very 
broad sense here to avoid limiting my scope prematurely. Games like Tetris however are barren of 
any potential for this storytelling effort and therefore lie outside of that scope. Of course, this is  
not to say that they should be dismissed strictly as games.
An important aspect of narrative in digital games is that it unfolds dynamically. This might seem 
trivial after reading the previous paragraphs, but it entails an important change in the structure of 
narratives (and hence the structure of their reception): They are, opposed to traditional texts, non-
linear. In the context of their notion of a gamic mode of history, Clyde et. al. still call the recipient 
of narratives 'reader' rather than 'player' or just 'recipient' throughout the whole paper, which 
might explain why they do no concern themselves with the shift such a structural change has.
The objection to the notion of a gamic mode of history, then, is twofold: First, the peril to leave 
the recipient of any such game any space which they can 'fill' with their own interpretation is very 
hard to avoid. Second, if Clyde et. al. succeed in their effort, what they will create can hardly be  
called a 'game': Although there is no one commonly agreed-upon definition of this term, virtually 
all attempts include the notion of a state which might develop favorably or unfavorably from the 
player's perspective, and whose development the player can influence. For comparison, two of the  
more well-known definitions of game, apart from the discussed MDA framework, shall be pre-
sented here:
“A game is a rule-based system with a variable and quantifiable outcome, where different 
outcomes are assigned different values, the player exerts effort in order to influence the 
outcome, the player feels emotionally attached to the outcome, and the consequence of the 
activity are negotiable.”23
“A game is a system in which players engage in an artificial conflict, defined by rules, that 
results in a quantifiable outcome.”24
This is not to say that Clyde et. al.'s effort is pointless, but it does not avail the vast potential  
inherent in digital games.
For the effort of this thesis,  another important distinction should be made here. As should 
become clear by contrasting the definitions by Juul and Salen & Zimmerman respectively on the 
one hand, and the MDA framework by Hunicke et. al. on the other, the two former elicit a much 
more traditional notion of what it means to play a game. They speak of 'engaging in conflict' and 
'exerting effort'  to reach a 'quantifiable outcome'.  They focus on games as systems, that, as I  
would take it, can be played more or less skillfully, to the end of 'succeeding' or 'beating' the game 
or other players in it, or 'losing' or 'failing' at trying to do so. The MDA framework does no such 
thing. Rather, it focuses on the user's actions, but to the end of invoking experiences (the aesthet-
23 Juul 2005, 36
24 Salen & Zimmerman 2004, 80
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ics). It can thus be used in a more versatile fashion to describe any kind of interactive system, like  
one that aims for interactive storytelling. I will come back to do so later in this thesis.
This chapter only lead to a realization that my research question, stated in the previous chapter,  
cannot be answered in a straightforward way. This is for two reasons: There is a high, and com-
monly agreed-upon standard of writing and mediating history. It is not trivial to uphold this stan-
dard when the mediation is attempted not in the form of a constructivist non-dynamic narrative, 
but in an interactive system (as defined by Hunicke et. al.) with its dynamically unfolding narrative  
and the consequently larger scope of possible interpretations. Clyde et. al.’s gamic mode of history  
can be interpreted as an attempt to maximize for veracity and verifiability at the expense of  
verisimilitude, even though the latter seems to be very quality by which games could make a dif-
ference  in  his  trilemma.25 Maximizing  for  a  verisimilar  experience  like  “many  history-themed 
games that revolve around war” do, using “historical facts and rhetorical story telling techniques 
borrowed from prior media forms (e.g. film and television) in an attempt to convince the player 
that they are telling the ‘real’ story”26 is a more obvious trap. The experience of an interactive nar-
rative that only unfolds in response to the player's actions presents a greater challenge because it 
alters the understanding of the presented (pieces of the) past: “In games, as soon as the player has 
agency to make meaningful choices and they are playing with the past, every action is a counter-
factual.”27 The demanded demarcation of possible interpretations is still necessary, but cannot be 
achieved in the same fashion under changed circumstances.
3 Making sense of the past
In an attempt to find another solution that can work in the context of interactive narratives, I will 
have to examine more thoroughly the notion of narrative and the role it plays in human lives. I  
hope that through a sufficiently nuanced understanding I  will  be able to make the necessary 
caveats that are needed to make historical interactive storytelling workable and to free narrative 
(and especially the reception thereof) from the deep reservations with which it is regarded by 
Clyde et. al.
In this chapter I will predominantly build upon two approaches from the philosophy of history  
and psychology respectively: Paul Ricoeur in his works Narrative Time and the “magisterial”28 Time 
25 This is not to say that linear and/or non-multimedial narratives cannot seem verisimilar. In fact, the same 
caveats about a mere ‘appeal to rhetoric’ has to be made with any tool used to convey historical arguments.
26 Clyde et. al. 2012, 10
27 Ibid., 11
28 White 1987, 170
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and Narrative,  and, later, on Jerome Bruner with  Acts of Meaning and  Life as Narrative.  Both 
claim a deep interwovenness of narrative in the structure of human understanding of events and  
states in the world, and accordingly touch upon what is commonly called the human condition. It 
seems that recourse to such suspiciously wide, yet fundamental grounds is necessary, after consid-
ering the problems with conveying history through narrative that have been discussed above.  
Bruner states:
"The fact that the historian's 'empirical' account and the novelist's imaginative story share the 
narrative form is, on reflection, rather startling. It has challenged thoughtful students both of 
imaginative literature and of history since Aristotle. Why the same form for fact and fiction? 
Does the first mimic the second or vice versa? How does narrative acquire its form?"29
It is apparent that several strands of cultural practices and meaning-making, be it for either (only  
ostensibly purely?) aesthetic or practical purposes, are running together in the narrative form. 
From a practical perspective, it is a necessary prerequisite to untangle those in order to know how 
to use employ them for any means of historical mediation.
3.1 Narrative as an expression of human experience of time
Ricoeur's interest in his works is even more fundamental. It lies in the “relation between language, 
narrative  discourse,  and  temporality.”30 His  presupposition is  that  narrativity  is  the  “language 
structure that  has  temporality  as  its  ultimate referent.”31 This  statement can be unpacked by 
answering the following questions:
1. Why is temporality so fundamental or important that all efforts of narrativity ultimately 
point to it?
2. How does narrativity then refer to temporality?
He answers these by initially contrasting, and then merging, Augustine's Confessions and Aristo-
tle's  Poetics.  Augustine discusses the fundamental aporia of the being and non-being of time: 
“How can time exist if the past is no longer, if the future is not yet, and if the present is not  
always?”32 He notes the large inventory of positive terms that are used to refer to (events in) time, 
and especially how an uncanny number of those terms use spatial vocabulary like 'take place' or 
'passing time'. The according question by Augustine that follows: “If the future and the past do 
exist, I want to know  where they are.”33 He solves this, seemingly rather bluntly, by shifting all 
three conceptions of time into the present: "The present of past things is the memory; the present 
29 Bruner 1990, 45
30 White 1987, 171
31 Ricoeur 2002, 169
32 Ricoeur 1984, 7
33 Saint Augustine, 18:23, emphasis mine
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of present things is direct perception [...]; and the present of future things is expectation"34.
However, the utility of a somehow spatial time is not entirely captured yet, because what it 
also promised was not only a location at which it could be found, but also the measurability that 
stems from this quality. How, then, can one speak of different lengths of time, if past and future  
only exist in the mind and the present is only an ever-changing “pointlike”35 instance? As with the 
threefold conception of time, the answer (but not the solution) lies in shifting the matter into the  
human consciousness (what Augustine calls soul): “It is in the soul, hence as an impression, that 
expectation and memory possess extension.”36 To give some practical sense to this abstract frame-
work, I shall follow Ricoeur's example and cite an entire illustrative paragraph:
“Suppose that I am going to recite a psalm that I know. Before I begin my faculty of 
expectation is engaged [tenditur] by the whole of it. But once I have begun, as much of the 
psalm as I have removed from the province of expectation and relegated to the past now 
engages [tenditur] my memory, and the scope of the action [actionis] which I am performing 
is divided [distenditur] between the two faculties of memory and expectation, the one looking 
back to the part which I have already recited, the other looking forward to the part which I 
have still to recite. But my faculty of attention [attentio] is present all the while, and through 
it passes [traicitur] what was the future in the process of becoming the past. As the process 
continues [agitur et agitur], the province of memory is extended in proportion as that of 
expectation is reduced, until the whole of my expectation is absorbed. This happens when I 
have finished my recitation and it has all passed into the province of memory.”37
While consciousness works its way through the psalm, it is “engaged” in all three parts of the 
divided present. Conceptualized as such, the aporia of time is not entirely resolved; it just shifted 
from outside of the human consciousness inwards. The question of being and non-being of time 
might have lost its immediacy, but the question of its extension only lead to a distention of con-
sciousness  due  to  “the  noncoincidence  of  the  three  modalities  of  action,” 38 also  expressed 
metaphorically by the spatial vocabulary (“looking forward”, “looking back”, “province of expecta-
tion”, “province of memory”).
Augustine's solution is thus not blunt at all, but entails a shift in the way we relate to time:  
Rather than merely suffering this impenetrable enigma, it sets the human mind to work. The con-
sequence of this will be laid out as follows.
What is needed at this point of Ricoeur's considerations is a solution for the  distention that 
consciousness “suffers” from,39 because the “three modalities of action” are lacking connection – 
preferably causal connection – with one another. Ricoeur engages in a reinterpretation of Aristo-
tle's Poetics to prove his “basic hypothesis that between the activity of narrating a story and the  
34 Ibid., 20:26
35 Ricoeur 1984, 17
36 Ibid., 19
37 Saint Augustine, 28:38, square brackets in original
38 Ricoeur 1984, 20
39 Ibid., 22
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temporal character of human experience there exists a correlation that is not merely accidental 
but that presents a transcultural form of necessity.”40 For this he deconstructs Aristotle’s notion of 
mythos into three parts: mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3, which can be mapped onto the parts of 
the threefold present. Mimesis1 is the symbolic order that surrounds us as culture and which is 
naturally understood (at least in one's own culture) as “prenarrative experience”41 or simply “pre-
figuration.”42 It informs narration, in the sense that it provides, or rather imposes, events, which 
are then made into a fixed story in mimesis2.
By consuming this story, its readers or listeners (i.e. its recipients) reintroduce it back into the 
cultural sphere in mimesis3. For the effort of this thesis, it is important to note here that the recip-
ient does not merely absorb or copy the information of the story as it is laid out in mimesis 2. 
Rather, “it is the reader who completes the work inasmuch as [...] the written work is a sketch for  
reading.”43 Mimetic action, divided as such into three parts, is necessarily circular because it begins 
and arrives at the same point, which is the symbolic order of culture. How Ricoeur argues that this  
circle is not a vicious one (i.e. that engaging in mimetic action is not a zero-sum game) will be 
shown presently.
Most of the effort in the first volume of Time and Narrative is devoted to the mediating func-
tion that mimesis2 fulfills between its two adjacent parts. This function is accomplished through 
emplotment. Ricoeur prefers this term to that of plot to highlight the “dynamic character of the 
configurating operation,”44 which, one could say, falls in line with the way the human mind is set  
to work in the face of the threefold present. Emplotment mediates in three ways:
1. It takes the aforementioned events and organizes them into a story, “an intelligible whole, 
of a sort such that we can always ask what is the 'thought' of this story.”45
2. It takes the heterogeneous parts of mimesis1 – “agents, goals, means, interactions, circum-
stances, unexpected results”46 – and arranges them into a sequence. Put in another way, it 
“makes appear within a syntagmatic order all the components capable of figuring in the 
paradigmatic tableau.”47
3. It reflects the paradox of time by connecting events that would otherwise only belong to 
an incidental succession into a story, “the unity of a temporal whole.”48








47 Ibid., 66, emphasis mine
48 Ibid.
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about narrative, to Aristotle's  Poetics, which do not consider the temporal characteristics of the 
plot. It is precisely this connection that solves the paradox of temporality, and thus Ricoeur's core 
argument:
“By mediating between the two poles of event and story, emplotment brings to the paradox a 
solution that is the poetic act itself. This act, which I just said extracts a figure from a 
succession, reveals itself to the listener or the reader in the story's capacity to be followed.”49
The distention of consciousness is thus resolved insofar as events (in time) can be subsumed under  
one 'point', that of the whole story, yet not resolved insofar as the story's 'point' is only reached by 
following through its successive events. Each of the story’s events can only be evaluated in light of 
the totality of events, yet their configuration prevents us from viewing them at the same time.  
This “converts the paradox into a living dialectic.”50
Returning to the apprehended problem of mimesis' circularity, it can now be said that, because  
of the dialectical nature of emplotment, mimetic activity does not just return to the same point 
from which it started. The events of the plot cannot simply be dissolved into the one 'point' of the  
story, in the same way that its outcome cannot be anticipated at its start. Using Greek tragedies as  
an example,  Ricoeur  highlights  the  “upsetting  role  of  the peripeteia,  those  contingencies  and 
reversals of fortune” which “[t]he plots themselves  coordinate.”51 If emplotment was “the simple 
triumph of 'order',”52 it would render the mere notion of peripeteia meaningless, because if one 
knows the order of things, they will always be able to foresee a change in (the plot's) circum-
stances. Ricoeur thus prefers to “speak of an endless spiral that would carry the meditation past  
the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes,”53 rather than a (vicious) circle.
3.2 Narrative as culturally situated meaning making of events
Contrary to Ricoeur’s interest in the relation between temporality and narrativity, from which his 
conception of the three-part mimesis springs,  Jerome Bruner approaches the matter from the 
question of narratives’ utility in one’s concrete life, and especially in autobiographies. In Acts of  
Meaning he argues against a “fallacy that the human sciences inherited from the nineteenth cen-
tury”, according to which “culture was conceived as an ‘overlay’ on biologically determined human 
nature.”54 This basic assumption caused the field of psychology, at least in the time of Bruner writ-
ing Acts of Meaning, to generally dismiss culture as a possible explanation for people’s actions in  
life. All that could be measured and discussed was human behavior, which had to have its funda-
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 67
51 Ibid., 73, emphasis mine
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 72
54 Bruner 1990, 20
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mental roots in a biological setup, rather than  action,  specifically culturally situated action, to 
which one could ascribe intentionality in such a way that one could ask for the meaning of it.55 
Conversely,  Bruner  sees  culture as  exceeding and even redefining biological  constraints  of  all  
kinds:
But the devout Jew’s commitment to fasting on Yom Kippur or the devout Muslim's 
commitment to Ramadan is not captured by a recital of the physiology of hunger. And the 
incest taboo is powerful and directive in a way that gonadotrophins are not.”56
The decisive turn entailed by this situatedness of humans in symbolic systems is not immediately  
visible.  In  a  fundamentally  and  decisively  biology-driven  system,  evolution  extradites  human 
beings  to  behaving according to  their  genetic  markup,  which is  the  only  variable  capable  of 
change. This change, as we know, happens entirely at random and only shows its effects in the  
individuals’ (and, by extension, the genotypically similar individuals’) evolutionary success or fail-
ure. As such, evolution is both an undirected and incremental process.
Bruner refers to the turn only indirectly: “The divide in human evolution was crossed when cul-
ture became the major factor in giving form to the minds of those living under its sway. A product 
of history rather than of nature, culture now became the world to which we had to adapt and the 
tool kit for doing so.”57 Culture is both the environment and the tool kit to which and by which we 
adapt. This crucial difference to an entirely biology-driven environment opens up opportunities for 
change, perceptibly and occurring during an individual’s lifespan (hence it’s belonging to history,  
not nature). The individual is thus endowed with agency, and only in light of this we can ask about  
intentionality of their actions in any meaningful way.
In order for one to be able to engage in this symbolic system they have to have an operative  
understanding of it that reflects its twofoldedness and especially its reciprocity. Bruner calls this  
understanding folk psychology: “a set of more or less connected, more or less normative descrip-
tions about how human beings 'tick', what our own and other minds are like, what one can expect 
situated action to be like, what are possible modes of life, how one commits oneself to them, and 
so on.”58 The mechanics of folk psychology are strikingly similar to Ricoeur’s threefold mimesis: The  
human agent has an understanding of the surrounding culture (mimesis1), engages in it through 
situated action to which one can ascribe a ‘point’ or meaning (mimesis2), and (thus) reintroduces it 
back into culture (mimesis3). The remaining question of how narration could be swapped out for 
situated action in this system will be answered presently.
Before, I want to linger on a question that Ricoeur tacitly omitted. It is about the exact relation 
55 Ibid. 19
56 Ibid, 21f.




between mimesis1 at large, the cultural background noise if you will, and the concrete heteroge-
neous elements, taken from it at any given instance, to be made into a story (in mimesis 2). When 
and how are those elements imposed upon us, or does it just happen at random? In the latter case,  
how could it be plausible that they are ‘capable of figuring’? In the role Bruner asserts to narra-
tive, he lays out the pieces for us to construct an answer. He writes that it is the “organizing prin-
ciple of folk psychology” to be “narrative in nature rather than logical or categorical” 59 (more on 
this distinction in section 3.4 Narrative vs. nomological understanding and knowledge retention). 
However, this principle is only needed to negotiate between states of “canonicality and exception-
ality. Thus, while a culture must contain a set of norms, it must also contain a set of interpretive  
procedures for rendering departures from those norms meaningful in terms of established patterns 
of belief. […] Stories achieve their meanings by explicating deviations from the ordinary in a com-
prehensible form.”60 The utility of narrative is to provide meaning to a situation we encounter that 
does not fit our conception of what is ‘normal’. By implication, it can also be said that if there is  
nothing to be explained (i.e. everything presents itself to be canonical) in a given situation, it can-
not be made into a compelling story. There would be nothing to ‘drive’ it, and no non-canonical  
solution. This is why Ricoeur chose the peripeteia of Greek tragedies as his example to demon-
strate non-circularity of mimesis.
Bruner describes the manner in which narrative fulfills this function within folk psychology 
almost perfectly congruent with Ricoeur. This is not surprising, as he makes reference to him, and  
to Ricoeur making reference to W.B. Gallie in turn.61 However, this exercise of intersecting Ricoeur 
and Bruner is by no means superfluous: First, the former identified the aporia of being-in-time as  
the necessitator for narrative, the latter the situatedness of humans in culture. Second, the previ -
ously deferred discussion about the relation between situated action and  narrative, which have 
been shown to be somehow both central to folk psychology or mimesis respectively, will connect 
the two even more fundamentally, and provide a better foundation for achieving the effort of this  
thesis. Of what nature is this connection? Ricoeur already provided a description, but only as a  
unidirectional one: ”If, in fact, human action can be narrated, it is because it is always already 
articulated by signs, rules, and norms. It is always already symbolically mediated.” 62 Bruner devotes 
the latter half of Acts of Meaning to show that human action is not only symbolically mediated 
but actually springs from its situatedness within the folk-psychological framework.
He draws insights from a large number of psychological and anthropological studies to make 
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primitive folk psychology.”63 That is to say that even before little children gain the capacity to 
explain  the meaning of  social  behavior,  they have an inherent  understanding of  it.  They can  
understand others’ intentions and their own effect on them and thus guide or misguide others’  
attention. To provide just one example of an experiment where children had to hide an object,
“even two-to-three-year-olds will withhold relevant information from the searcher, and even 
create and then supply the searcher with such false information as misleading footprints that 
lead away from the hidden treasure. The hide-and-seek task, the authors [Chandler et. al.] 
note, 'clearly engaged the subject's own self-interests and ... pitted them against those of 
another real person' and 'allowed them to directly evidence in action rather than tell about ... 
false beliefs of others.’”64
As the last two lines illustrate, children of the same age fail to explain the same kind of action,  
evoked by false beliefs, if they have to give account of it as mere bystanders. Although children 
(naturally) grow more competent in their use of language over time, they seem to be bound in 
their development by the capacity to firstly interact upon a folk-psychological understanding of 
others, before being able to give a narrative account of it. This does not violate Bruner’s afore-
mentioned point that this cultural achievement is more than a mere ‘overlay’ of biological traits:  
One cannot “establish any formal continuity between an earlier ‘preverbal’ and a later functionally 
‘equivalent’ linguistic form.”65 Instead he claims that there must be a “human push”, a set of bio-
logical  predispositions that allow us,  within the framework of folk psychology,  a “to organize 
experience narratively.”66 The manifold ways this organizing activity can take on, however, are also 
empowered by the child’s respective culture.67
Bruner goes so far to even claim that the order in which we acquire different narrate skills can 
be grounded in this ‘human push’. He extensively recounts the developmental steps of Emily, sub-
ject  of  the  book  Narratives from the Crib,68 who’s  bed-time soliloquies  were  recorded for  15 
months from her 18th month on, and traces the development of four fundamental narrative traits 
throughout that  phase.  This development did not occur  in four strictly  sequential  stages,  but 
rather overlapped as each trait became more fleshed out and thus widened the base for the next  
one.
The first two, ‘agentivity’ of action and sequentiality of events and states,69 are interlinked. 
Human action is attributed with specific goals and the effects and outcomes of such actions are  
organized into a sequential order, which spells out the effects and outcomes of such actions. This  
is done with increasing accuracy over time: Emily, in narrating the events of the day to  herself, 
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initially made “use of simple conjunctions, moved then to reliance upon temporals like and then, 
and passed finally to the use of causals like her ubiquitous  because.”70 This is to say that she 
became increasingly proficient in pointing out the syntagmtic order of her stories’ elements.
Thirdly, Emily internalized the concept of aforementioned canonicality, and used it through 
words such as “sometimes” and “always”, deontic qualifiers like “got to have”, and regular, ritual 
events like “Sunday mornings.”71 She used the canonical to assert regularity and order of things to 
herself, and to explicate non-canonical events where she could.
Lastly, Emily used her own personal perspective, i.e. gave a narrating ‘voice’ to her accounts. 
She did this either by “expressing her feelings” or by giving an “epistemic perspective” 72 when she 
was unsure about reasons for certain events or when she wanted to mark situations in the world  
as unclear.
Bruner interprets these deliberate efforts as her attempt to “organize her experience of human 
interactions in a lifelike, storylike way.”73 Emily corrected herself early on when she did not get the 
order of events right, put vocal emphasis on certain events that interested her especially, and tried 
overall to keep the narrative coherent, but predominantly in terms of her expectations and the 
regularity of events, and less so in terms of logical consistency.
Bruner calls these four traits the grammatical constituents of narration: agentivity, sequential-
ity, canonicality, and perspectivity. They work together to ultimately align one’s own as well as  
others’ actions and their perceived meanings with what is taken as culturally acceptable, or ‘nor-
mal’. Almost as if contingencies in behavior were an insufferable, because threatening, violation of 
the orderliness of the world, the function of narrative lies in “explicating the mitigating circum-
stances surrounding conflict-threatening breaches” not only in the respective story, but in life at 
large.74 This can take place on a personal level, as described in Emily’s case, or on an interpersonal 
level, when “one must make one's actions seem an extension of the canonical” through rhetorical 
ruses,75 for instance when trying to convince or appease others. More importantly though, Bruner 
attributes a peacekeeping function on a cultural level to narratives, which stems from the capacity 
“not to reconcile, not to legitimize, not even to excuse, but rather to explicate”76 non-canocial 
behavior. Cultural coherence, but not necessarily consistency, is thus maintained by a set of shared 
and sufficiently acceptable stories. To finally close the circle of his argumentation, Bruner repeat-









albeit not as highly developed, traits in other high primates.
To conclude: Whichever stance one takes, narrative seems to be deeply engrained in human 
consciousness, not just because of nurture, i.e. culture, but nature as well. Ricoeur and Bruner  
agree on the form that narrative takes. It is that of sequentialized events, situated spatially, tem-
porally and culturally, performed with certain intentions by actors.
3.3 The epistemology of narratives
Up to this point, the question of whether and how these concepts of narrativity can be related to  
historiography have been largely absent from this thesis. Although his chief interest in  Acts of  
Meaning lies elsewhere, Bruner is aware of the conceptual gap in which “the critical intersection 
where  verifiability and verisimilitude” come together, and points out that it is not yet solved in 
the field of psychology: “The next big advances in our understanding of language acquisition will  
probably be achieved when that dark subject is enlightened by developmental research.”77
For the time being, Ricoeur's considerations will have to suffice, although it can be said that 
Bruner’s findings are congruent with his argumentation. Ricoeur’s next step is to dismantle a sig-
nificant, because (at least in occidental societies) ubiquitous, conception that goes back to Aristo-
tle. It says that
1. narrative belongs to the realm of fiction alone, while
2. historiography concerns itself with truth claims, not unlike natural sciences.
Aristotle explicitly excluded historia from muthos, since what Ricoeur calls emplotment could, in 
his view, never grasp together the events of history, because “the real, unlike the possible which 
the poet conceives, and which the peripeteia illustrate, implies a contingency that escapes the  
poet's control.”78 Historical events thus resist to being subsumed under the one 'thought' of a 
story, and aligning the temporal with the causal, as in the equation of “one after the other” and  
“one because of the other”, which is so central to Ricoeur's emplotment, is not applicable to his -
torical events. With the same stroke, this way of explaining how past events unfolded in the way 
they did is dismissed as unscientific; even if emplotment could be applied here, the kind of under-
standing of history it provided would fall short of historians' scientific ambition.
To tackle this, Ricoeur lines up arguments that concern the notion of historical understanding,  
taken from a number of scholars (William H. Dray, Arthur C. Danto, W. B. Gallie, Louis 0. Mink),  
and joins them together to argue against the aforementioned conception. From Dray he borrows  
the criticism of the covering law model. In short, this model represents the attempt to find equiv-
alents for laws as they exist in the natural sciences, where, if one can say “X causes Y”, one should 
77 Ibid., 94
78 Ricoeur 1984., 162
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also be able to say “if  X,  then  Y.”79 Setting aside the obvious question of whether this can be 
achieved, Ricoeur argues that other modes of explanation exist and are accepted in sciences such 
as “cosmology, geology, and biology,” which “do not authorize prediction, but rather retrodic-
tion,”80 such as that if Y is the case, one can say that X must have had occurred.
The implication of this mode of explanation can be illustrated with a simple sentence: “In 1717, 
the author of Rameau's Nephew was born.”81 Not only makes it tacit reference to Diderot by men-
tioning his book, it (more importantly) describes and gives meaning to the year 1717 “in light of 
subsequent events,”82 i.e. his birth and his becoming a known author. The year's (or, for that mat-
ter, Diderot's birth's) significance is not inherent in these events per se, because the course of sub-
sequent events could have been different. Rather, the author of this sentence chose to link these 
events in such a way precisely to establish a causal relationship between them, notwithstanding 
there being an arbitrary number of other possible linkages.
To argue – and this is arguably his most crucial epistemological stance – that this contingent 
character  in  the  activity  of  'grasping together'  the  events  into  a  conclusion is  somehow less 
acceptable than the nomological character of finding conclusions in natural sciences is invalid to 
Ricoeur: ”Contingency is unacceptable only to a mind that attaches the idea of mastery to that of 
understanding.”83
In fact, it is exactly that capacity of emplotment to show how contingent events lead up to a  
certain conclusion that makes it most fitting as a (the?) format for historiographical inquiry. In the  
same way one cannot predict the conclusion of a narrative, we cannot predict the development of  
a historical situation, no matter how carefully we assess it. “Rather than being predictable, a nar-
rative's conclusion has to be acceptable. Looking back from the conclusion toward the intermedi-
ary episodes, we must be able to say that this end demanded those events and that chain of 
actions.”84 Peripeteia, around which mimesis2 revolves, is present in historical narratives as well, 
and thus the activity of emplotment still necessary.
However, according to Aristotle, what is acceptable is entirely subjective, and Ricoeur does not  
object to this. Moreover, from this follows that for the capacity of a story to be followed (all in  
the context of the Poetics), “[w]hat is impossible yet probable should be preferred to that which is 
possible  but  incredible."85 With Bruner  we can say  that  this  is  due to folk  psychology,  which 
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“focuses upon the expectable” and “endows [it] with legitimacy or authority.”86
The problem here is obvious: what Aristotle requires of emplotment is diametrically opposed to 
one of the pillars of historiography, namely the truth claim (cf. the aforementioned Clyde et. al.). 
A historical narrative can never abide by Aristotle, yet it requires 'followability' in spite of incredi -
bility lurking at every turn the would-be story decides to take. How can this be resolved?
Ricoeur borrows from Gallie to show that, in the context of narratives at large, it is entirely  
normal to employ explanations to tie contingent events together:
”The 'one because of the other' is not always easy to extract from the 'one after the other.' 
Consequently, our most elementary narrative understanding already confronts our 
expectations governed by our interests and our sympathies with reasons that, to fulfill their 
meaning, have to correct our prejudices. In this way, critical discontinuity is even incorporated 
into narrative continuity.”87
Incorporated, yes, but only with an “ancillary” function.88 Narrative needs explanation only in the 
face of discontinuities, i.e. to be kept “on the trail.”89
Bruner detects the same “puzzle-solving” approach when Emily is confronted with discontinu-
ities in her life. He then defines two genres of narration: the first – confusingly named – is narra-
tive, used per default as long as continuity is given. The second mode is “the logical or paradig-
matic, brought to bear on the task of explicating the breach in the narrative.”90 Emily became 
increasingly good at interdigitating these two, but they never fused, exactly because the latter is 
only ancillary.
But where a poet, as mentioned earlier, has entire control over the events, and can thus legiti-
mately give preference to the probable but impossible over the incredible but possible, a historian 
does and can not. Historical narratives will thus always require explanations if they are to be fol-
lowed.
It is important at this point to mention the caveat that explaining discontinuities in historical  
narratives entails: critical inquiry does not hold an  inherent spot in this otherwise so coherent 
framework, because followability relies only on the 'coherent' quality of the explanations, whether 
they are true or not.91 This might even be seen as a (if not the) reason for the discomfort that this 
86 Bruner 1990, 47
87 Ricoeur 1984, 152, emphasis mine
88 Ibid., 154
89 Ibid., 155
90 Bruner 1990, 93f
91 Another question that might be interesting in the context of narratology, but not necessarily 
historiography, is how our evaluation of this coherence is shaped, especially by culture. The motives of 
characters, as well as the explanations offered for unforeseen events in narratives from outside of one’s own 
cultural background are sometimes quite hard to understand (read: accept), be it the sagas of Icelanders or 
contemporary Korean films. Explanations in the context of historical writing should, naturally, take those 
cultural differences into account, which does not mean that their scientific character should be diluted by 
cultural relativism.
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narrative mode of history provokes. If, in the activity of emplotment, there is always a proclivity to 
slip in the probable but impossible explanation, because it might resolve the discontinuities more 
elegantly than the scientific, but laborious, historical reasoning, then this construct Ricoeur puts 
forth is indeed a fragile one.
I had written in 1 Introduction about Ephesus that it seemed to invite the mind to conjure up 
its own ideas and stories, only to graft them onto the physical substrate of that site. Those stories,  
however, can by no means be called history, and might not even be connected to the (presented)  
past in a meaningful way. The problem for historical storytelling is actually that Ephesus provides 
a lot to work with, in such a way that one can easily impose a modern view of what life in an  
ancient Roman city was like. If the nascent stories in the visitor’s mind require explanations, they 
can easily be picked from any kind of fiction or pop culture, and also arbitrarily connect the physi-
cal pieces of the past. The probable but impossible (the verisimilar) has a strong advantage over 
the incredible but possible (the verifiable and veracious) in contexts like this.
Do those explanations that are in fact preserving verifiability and veracity match the construc-
tivist approach of “analysing how and what individual pieces of evidence can do” to form “evi-
dence relationships”, as Clyde et. al. put it?92 According to Ricoeur they do, as long as it is done in 
the form of a narrative. Clyde et. al. somewhat deviate from this by suggesting that there is a con-
ceptual gap between explaining and narrating, one that opens up space for the “move from a 
basic discussion of epistemology to one of [the] practice” of writing history.93 This can be under-
stood as a dichotomy in historiography between the activities of forming an understanding of his-
tory (Clyde et. al. repeatedly use the vocabulary of creating/establishing “truth claims and theo-
ries” about the past94) and having those, in a second step, “communicated through a narrative.”95 
Those activities are, I would say, regarded by Ricoeur as interdependent parts of mimesis 2: ”Every 
story, we have said, in principle explains itself. In other words, narrative answers the question 
'Why?' at the same time that it answers the question 'What?' To tell what has happened is to tell  
why it happened.”96
Similarly, as Bruner described in his account of Emily’s soliloquies, the element of narrative that 
allowed her to make truth claims was that in which she expressed her own perspective on the nar-
rated events. Thus, the narrative “cannot, in the jargon of narratology, be ‘voiceless’” 97 and the 
truth claims will always be understood as integral parts of the story. Clyde et. al. cannot effec -
tively separate (their) perspective from the narrative as a whole.
92 Clyde et. al. 2012, 7
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What is more, they locate a past “that can be known in a multitude of ways” 98 in the deconstruc-
tionist approach to historical writing, which, in turn, leads to two possible inferences about their  
notion of narrative in the constructivist approach:
1. As a string of events that should only be subsumed under one correct 'thought' of a story, 
i.e. with one set of explanations, or
2. as the notion that each individual event must be exclusive to one story, which would 
entail that different narratives could never touch upon (i.e. share) the same events.
If either, but especially the latter, is the case, then what Clyde et. al. seek in their paper comes 
dangerously close to the assumption of the  covering law model: rather than seeking a critically 
justifiable 'path' that leads backwards through time to explain how the events came about as they 
did, they would look for a more, or even the solely acceptable of all the conceivable paths. If there  
were such a path, would that not require the notion of an epistemology which allowed to deem 
one historical narrative more appropriate than another, outside of a case-by-case analysis? And 
would that, in turn, not entail that, once a recipient recognizes the regularity of a narrative (the  
trope, as it were), could they not anticipate the further progress of that narrative? This would cer-
tainly erase all peripeteia, which is, as Ricoeur showed, essential to the recipients' willingness to  
follow any story.
A practical example should serve as a counter argument: In the German Emigration Center the 
life stories of all the emigrants are ‘bundled together’ once each of them entered the ship to the  
New World. It is convenient for this museum to focus on that particular part of their journey,  
because all of them had to partake in it in one way or another. There are commonalities and dis -
similarities in the those lives’ stories, and those can be joined or contrasted to offer different per -
spectives on the history of emigration to the New World. Some are certainly less representative of 
that archetypal history than others, but that does not make them ’wrong’ or less accurate per se.  
There is in fact some regularity in the presented stories, but they are by no means perfectly con-
gruent.  As  has  been  said,  the  German  Emigration  Center  highlights  this  very  incongruence 
between the stories by assigning another emigrant’s story to the admission ticket (iCard) at each 
visit, so that every time the same archetypal history can be told, but from a slightly different per-
spective. This increases the likelihood for the visitor to visit the museum again and to be willing to  
follow the same story again, because it is not actually the same story every time.
To deepen this regress even further, I want to connect Ricoeur's criticism of the covering law 
model to his assertion that the activity of mimesis2 is circular but non-vicious, which is in turn 
verifiable by the presence of peripeteia in the respective narrative:
98 Clyde et. al. 2012, 9
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If one could indeed apply the covering law model and thus 'master' the understanding of a 
given (therefore: also the present) historical situation, we would be able to derive a proper way to 
react to every question that the run of events in our lives imposed on us, at least as long as we 
had sufficient knowledge of the same kinds of events, be they described by somebody else or 
experienced by us earlier. This would correspond to the dismissed notion of a vicious circle (i.e one 
that returns to the point it started from) in narrative, where one can anticipate the outcome of a  
narrative right at the start. Thus nothing could perceivably change in the course of history, as long 
as the actors were not oblivious to the presumed covering laws, just like no interesting outcome  
could be produced in a game of tic-tac-toe that is being played by non-novice players. From mere 
observation we can say that history changes, and that the future is indeed unknowable, so the 
thesis of there being even the possibility of a covering law is currently unsupported.
For the effort of this thesis, this entails:
1. We are left with the narrative-based epistemology of history, as laid out by Ricoeur and 
Bruner.
2. The methodology through which the scientific character of the explanations in nonlinear  
interactive narratives is  ensured must be well  defined,  so that the  truth claim can be 
upheld.
To present alternatives to the aforementioned covering law model, Ricoeur borrows two compati-
ble modes of explanation from Dray.
The first, named causal analysis, can be illustrated by going back to the example of “X causes 
Y”. It is used to verify whether X can be regarded as a cause for Y, i.e. whether the explanation of 
any contingency in a historical narrative is also legitimate in an epistemological sense. This test  
consists of two parts: “The first is an inductive one. The factor in question must be a really neces-
sary one. The second is a  pragmatic test. There must be a reason for selecting the condition in 
question from among the conditions that as a whole constitute the sufficient condition for the  
phenomenon.”99 For a candidate to be “really necessary” one must be able to say that if X had not 
occurred, Y could not have occurred (in the same fashion) either. The inductive test is thus a neg-
ative one,  “eliminating from the list  of  candidates  for  the  role  of  cause  those  factors  whose 
absence would not have changed the course of events.”100 For causal analysis to provide a positive 
explanation, historians have to continue “filling in the gaps”101 in order to be able to “defend their 





thesis”102 about the reasons Y came about as it did. Of course, each X in this set of presumed rea-
sons for Y will still have to pass the inductive test. As there is no law from which one could deduce 
whether a set of factors could be deemed a sufficient explanation, historians have to make judg-
ments, very much in the legal sense of the word, by “gathering together scattered factors and 
weighing their respective importance in producing the final result.”103 Ricoeur concedes that the 
distinction between (nomological) sciences and commonsense explanations is being blurred here,  
which, in the absence of covering laws, is only consequential.
The second proposed mode is  rational explanation.  In contrast to causal analysis,  it is only 
applicable to the actions of individuals rather than historical situations at large.  Outside of an 
“understanding through empathy, projection, or identification”, “we must inductively gather the 
evidence that allows us to evaluate the problem as the agent saw it.”104 Their actions have to be 
understandable in their respective context. If the latter does not provide a convincing explanation,  
all the historian can do is to work with the documents to reestablish it. A wager for a good expla-
nation reads like this: "If y is a good reason for A to do x, then y would be a good reason for any-
one sufficiently like  A to do  x under sufficiently similar circumstances."105 Bruner describes the 
same kind of activity even for everyday settings:
"In contrast, when you encounter an exception to the ordinary, and ask somebody what is 
happening, the person you ask will virtually always tell a story that contains reasons […]. If 
somebody comes into the post office, unfurls the Stars and Stripes, and commences to wave 
it, your folk-psychological interlocutor will tell you, in response to your puzzled question, that 
today is probably some national holiday that he himself had forgotten, that the local 
American Legion Post may be having a fundraiser, or even simply that the man with the flag is 
some kind of nationalistic nut whose imagination has been touched by something in this 
morning's tabloid."106
This kind of explanation is quite obviously located even further from the nomological sciences in 
terms of the rigidity of its truth claim. “In this regard, history does nothing different from what  
philology or textual  criticism does.  When the reading of some received text or interpretation 
appears to be discordant in relation to other accepted facts, the philologist or textual critic rear-
ranges the details to make everything intelligible again.”107
Everyone with a folk-psychological understanding of the world will employ this mode of expla-
nation. The power attributed to such an explanation will hinge on the knowledge about what it 
means to be ‘like A’ under the given ‘circumstances’. In the excavation site of Troy there is very lit-
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imagination to work, while in Ephesus the possible problem lies in offering too much sensory input  
to the visitor, without enough interpretative guidance and without distinguishing the authentic  
remains from the reconstructed ones. The historical explanations that any non-scholarly visitor of  
such a site might invoke must be fraught with uncertainty.
Interestingly, Ricoeur explicitly orders the modes of explanation in terms of their explanatory 
power, from general to particular: “Hence the range must be left open from explanation by laws, 
to singular causal explanation, to judgment procedures, ... to rational explanation.”108 Bruner does 
not use the term ‘nomology’ himself,  but defines the aforementioned ‘ logical or paradigmatic 
mode’ of explanation at greater length in Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, four years before pub-
lishing Acts of Meaning: This mode “attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system 
of description and explanation. It employs categorization or conceptualization and the operations 
by which categories are established, instantiated, idealized, and related to one another to form a 
system.”109 Jonathan Adler, in his reading of Bruner, therefore concludes that the “paradigmatic 
mode offers the power of prediction in that it sets up and tests hypotheses about the nature of  
reality,”110 which is congruent with Ricoeur’s use of the word ‘nomological’.
3.4 Narrative vs. nomological understanding and knowledge 
retention
As has been laid out, narrative is both a powerful and, at least to some extend, innate human way 
to order events in the world around us and make them comprehensible. The epistemological rela -
tion between historiography and its subject, namely the past, has been discussed, with the – to  
some maybe disillusioning – conclusion that a nomological approach to explaining the past can-
not be achieved, and that we have to make do with the less rigorous tools in the just mentioned 
‘range’ of possible modes of explanation. The coupling of narrative, with its all too human folk-
psychological  baggage on one side  which prefers  the  canonical  and verisimilar,  and scholarly 
demands that require the veracious and verifiable on the other, is indeed quite an odd, but neces-
sary compromise.
As already alluded to in the previous section, the narrative ‘push’, in its reciprocal relation to  
the symbolic order of culture, forms a means of understanding that is a fundamental constant 
which not only cannot be escaped by historiography, but that is constitutive of the human condi-
tion. It is “already ‘there,’ deeply entrenched in culture and language.”111 To reiterate my point 
from the introduction, I see this already as a good enough reason to use narrative to mediate  
108 Ibid., 127, ellipsis in source
109 Bruner 1986, 12
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(interpretations of) the past.
However, before discussing the more practical aspects of this mediation, there is one more point 
to be made on behalf of narrative. This one is not epistemological but pragmatic, because it con-
cerns the dissemination rather than the creation of knowledge. It says that,  aside from being  
inescapable, narrative can also be a more effective tool for creating understanding than ontologi-
cal statements.
While laying out his four fundamental narrative traits, Bruner noted only in passing that “logi-
cal propositions are most easily comprehended by the child when they are imbedded in an ongo-
ing story.”112 Of course, our capacity to understand those logical propositions does not stop at the  
narrative level, because our culturally acquired capacities of understanding do not require a for-
mal continuity from our biological predispositions. However, it is evident that we are nevertheless  
prone to let narrative thinking override probabilistic thinking. Michael Shermer calls this trait –  
quite conveniently, but with no apparent reference to Bruner – folk numeracy: “our natural ten-
dency to misperceive and miscalculate probabilities, to think anecdotally instead of statistically,  
and to focus on and remember short-term trends and small-number runs.”
There are several aspects to folk numeracy. First, humans focus on the recent and exceptional 
rather than on the long-term and steady: ”We notice a short stretch of cool days and ignore the  
long-term global-warming trend. We note with consternation the recent downturn in the housing 
and stock markets, forgetting the half-century upward-pointing trend line.“113 Second, we per-
ceive (seemingly statistically relevant) patterns in phenomena when there are none. Gamblers with 
a lucky streak are an example of this. They “notoriously employ both the ‘hot streak fallacy’ and 
the ‘dueness fallacy’“, although “the roulette wheel has no memory“, i.e. is not more likely to yield 
one number or color over another based on previous turns.114 Third, and partly resting on the first 
two aspects, confirmation bias lets us highlight “astonishing coincidences and forget the vast sea 
of meaningless data“115 when the latter contradict already held beliefs.
This culminates in a sort of working understanding of the world that stems from anecdotes and 
that can easily override knowledge and understanding of statistical data. Similarly to Bruner, Sher-
mer holds our “evolved brains that pay attention to anecdotes“116 accountable for this.
To illustrate the effect of folk numeracy, a more extensive example will have to be laid out. It is  
an instance of the base-rate fallacy which leads people “to make judgments of probability based  
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contradicts the former.117 Daniel Kahneman reiterates three consecutive psychological studies:
The first, conducted by John Darley and Bibb Latane, has since become renowned as the “help-
ing experiment”: Participants in groups of six were asked to speak in turn, anonymously over an  
intercom, about their lives and problems. One of those participants was a stooge who always took  
the first turn and mentioned in his scripted speech that he was prone to seizures. When it was his 
turn again after after everybody else in the group had spoken once, he “became agitated and 
incoherent, said he felt a seizure coming on, and asked for someone to help him”118 and made 
choking noises before his microphone was cut off and automatically turned to the next partici-
pant. Out of a total of 15 participants only four responded immediately to the appeal for help, five 
more came out of their booths “only well after the ‘seizure victim’ apparently choked” 119 and the 
remaining six did not leave their booths at all. This behavior, in which personal responsibility is  
diffused among several persons, is known as the bystander effect.120
In the second study, conducted by Richard Nisbett and Eugene Borgida, another set of partici-
pants was shown “videos of brief interviews allegedly conducted with two people” who had partic-
ipated in the first study. The interviews were deliberately kept short, bland and uninformative, so  
that  the participants  could  not  conclude much about the interviewees likelihood to  help  the 
stooge from the first study.121 One half of the participants (of the second study) was told about 
the procedure of the “helping experiment,” the other half about about the procedure as well as  
the (surprising) results. They were then asked to guess the likelihood of the two interviewees to  
help the seizure victim. While it was expectable that the first half would predict both interviewees 
to help, based on their general assumptions about human nature and behavior, the second half 
should be expected to base their predictions on the base rate of 4 out of 15, or 27%, since they 
could not infer anything (contrary) from the interviews. However, the predictions of both groups  
were indistinguishable.122 Nisbett and Borgida concluded that their students “quietly exempt”123 
the particular cases they were shown from the general rule of the statistics (which they knew).
The inverse method had a profoundly different effect: In a third study, Nisbett and Borgida 
taught a new set of participants about the procedure of the first study and showed them the  
interviews, but did not mention the study’s outcome. Instead, they told them that the two alleged 
participants “had not helped the stranger, then asked them to guess the global results. The out-
117 Curtis 2014
118 Kahneman 2011, 171
119 Ibid.
120 A sample size of only 15 is admittedly small, but Kahneman’s point lies in the reaction (i.e. the learning 
outcomes) of the participants of the second and third studies to the results of the first. The results of the 
“helping experiment” itself have been confirmed many times and correlations between other factors and the 





come was dramatic: the students’ guesses were extremely accurate.”124
This demonstrates a telling dichotomy between the participants’ ‘intellectual’ understanding of 
the statistical data and their capacity or willingness to actually incorporate this knowledge when 
assessing a social situation. Kahneman’s conclusion could just as well be found in Bruner’s Acts of  
Meaning: “[S]urprising individual cases have a powerful impact […] because the incongruity must 
be resolved and embedded in a causal story.”125 Granted, those psychological studies are quite dif-
ferent from the historiological ‘after-the-fact reasoning’ that Ricoeur defends, exactly because  
they are repeatable and controllable studies: “The symmetry between explanation and prediction, 
characteristic of the nomological sciences, is broken at the very level of historical statements.” 126 
My point is not to weaken the explanatory power of those studies in particular or the scientific 
method in general, or reduce them relative to the level of the aforementioned modes of explana-
tion that are employed in historiography. Rather, the insight here is that even in the nomological 
sciences it is apparently more effective to teach about their findings by ‘wrapping’ them in narra -
tives. In historiography the very activity of knowledge creation is the same as knowledge presenta-
tion. Its epistemology is reflected in its means of conveyance and vice versa. The same congruence 
cannot be claimed for nomological sciences – but that the ‘weak’ narrative proves more effective 
even to convey those intrinsically ‘stronger’ findings from nomological sciences shows how our  
brains are “belief engines that employ association learning to seek and find patterns”127 and pay 
attention to narratives first and foremost.
Real-world examples, both for the better and the worse, are abundant. Charities are now being 
advised to “keep the message centered around human beings,“128 as opposed to a “larger, unnamed 
or statistical group of people.“129 A 2007 study by Small et. al. found that presenting an ‘identifi-
able victim’ of famine is a much more effective way to raise money than presenting statistics 
about a large number of people in the same situation as that one victim: People “pay greater  
attention and have stronger emotional reactions to vivid rather than pallid information.” 130 More-
over, even when presented with both the statistical data and the identifiable victim’s story, dona-
tions declined relative to the cases where only the victim was presented.
Similarly, stories with little or no scientific evidence can still catch on if they seem plausible  
and are crafted in an appealing way. One example is the spread of a rumor that links the increased 
rate of the birth defect microcephaly in South America to a larvicide allegedly produced by Mon-
124 Ibid., 173
125 Ibid., 174, emphasis mine
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santo. One article131 published in Tech Times cites an Argentinian doctors’ group that claims that 
areas where the larvicide Pyriproxyfen was used showed a sharp increase of cases of microcephaly,  
despite it not being “clear that such a geographical connection exists,“ and “despite a near-univer-
sal consensus among scientists and health officials that the cause is almost certainly the mos-
quito-borne Zika virus.“132 Furthermore, that larvicide is actually produced not by Monsanto but a 
company called Sumitomo, and had been “approved and registered for use in the past 20 years by  
the authorities of around 40 countries around the world.“133 This company is in fact only associ-
ated with Monsanto, and not its subsidiary, as the Tech Times article claimed. In conclusion, it can  
be  said  that  every  detail  of  this  story  is  either  untrue  or lacks  evidence,  but the connection  
between a widely vilified company such as Monsanto, allegedly causing birth defects in children, is  
more appealing (i.e., with Aristotle, more probable) than a more complex explanation without such 
an identifiable agent. Although the story was corrected in February 2016, only days after it was 
first published, it is still being heavily shared on social media platforms.134 From this proclivity one 
could even deduce an imperative for conveying an interpretation of the past that is preemptive of 
(the most) common misconceptions about a given historical situation. In the case of Troy and 
especially Ephesus this means that it is  also the historian-storyteller’s responsibility to counter 
preconceived but misleading impressions from popular culture of ‘what life was like’ in the Roman 
or Greek era.
Employing narratives can even be opportune to convey one’s findings to other scientists (rather 
than the public at large) when those findings are not as simple and elegant as expected, e.g. when 
“the equation is messy, the molecule looks like an odd clump of pasta, and the mechanism has at  
least 17 steps” as Hoffmann puts it.135 He gives this example where such a result is ‘unpleasing’, 
hence  its  coming about requiring  explanation,  apparently  much in  the  same way of  Bruner’s  
‘explicating of deviations’. When such a task is at hand, the scientist’s role is split into two, which  
he calls the ‘scrabbler’ and the ‘writer’:
“The first is the scientist trying to understand; in his or her mind is a congeries of what 
teachers taught, what is known. He or she concocts fecund stories of what might be and calls 
them hypotheses. […] The writer sanitizes, gives the best yield of a reaction, the most plausible 
story, as mathematically or logically dressed up as possible.”136
Using Ricoeur’s framework, this can be interpreted as the scientist first trying to gather together  
the heterogeneous elements  of mimesis1 and then arranging them into  a story  (mimesis2),  to 
131 Navarro 2016
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finally present them to the scientific community (mimesis3). The obvious difference to a ‘pure’ nar-
rating exercise, with elements taken from cultural prefiguration, is that the would-be narrative 
elements are also ‘created’ by the scientist and tested against reality. This fact-producing activity 
in itself is foreign to the narrative framework.137 However, “facts are mute. One needs to situate 
the facts, or […] weave them into nothing else but a narrative.”138
4 Structure, conveyance and reception of medial 
information
As both structure and interpretation of narrative are so vital to this thesis' effort, I will have to 
explore the means of structuring and conveying that narrative to an audience. In what way should 
a narrative be presented to the narratee to convey a sound historical interpretation? From a histo-
riographical point of view one might choose one of two fundamentally different approaches: The 
presentation should either always accommodate the ‘critical inquiry’ that Ricoeur saw in histori-
ography when ordering the ‘heterogeneous elements’ of a story into a coherent narrative string, or 
afford no meaningful, i.e. no non-arbitrary interpretation of the past at all.
This latter approach falls well into the category of deconstructionism as described in chapter  
3.3 The epistemology of narratives. As has been shown in the last two sections, it would be excep-
tionally hard to accomplish, and only at the cost of foregoing the fundamentally human and  
(therefore potentially) engaging mode of making sense of the past through narratives altogether. 
The former approach might be located in the category of constructionism, but only insofar as the 
critical inquiry of assessing “what individual pieces of evidence can do,”139 which Clyde et. al. deci-
sively declared the exclusive domain of the scholar, can be shifted (at least partly) to the narratee.  
As discussed in the previous section, it is just as important for educational purposes, i.e. for non-
superficial understanding and knowledge retention, to also convey narratives in an engaging way 
that takes folk psychology and folk numeracy into account.
The challenge in conveying historical interpretation (at least to a non-scholarly audience) is 
thus to not let veracious conclusions fall at the expense of the engaging quality and recipatory  
freedom for the narratees. To discuss possible strategies to manage, if not resolve the tension  
137 The thus described relation between nomological science and narrative can even be everted with regard to 
the moment of nomological hypothesis creation: “We all know by now that many scientific and mathematical 
hypotheses start their lives as little stories or metaphors, but they reach their scientific maturity by a process of 
conversion into verifiability, format or empirical, and their power at maturity does not rest upon their dramatic 
origins. Hypothesis creation (in contrast to hypothesis testing) remains a tantalizing mystery – so much so that 
sober philosophers of science, like Karl Popper, characterize science as consisting principally of the falsification 
of hypotheses, no matter the source whence the hypothesis has come.” (Bruner 1984, 12)
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between those poles, I will look at the impact that differently structured and medially conveyed 
narratives have on their receivers. I will draw upon insights from literature-, media-, and game 
studies, linguistics, and cognitive science to lay out how the human mind and different medial 
configurations structure the perception of media in general and narratives in particular.  Those 
findings will then be linked back to Ricoeur and Bruner to formulate a set of claims about the 
conveyance of historical narratives in different medial configurations.
When one attempts to convey any narrative to an audience, it has to be done through some 
medium. To illustrate what challenge this imposes on the would-be narrator, let me first present  
Espen Aarseth’s deconstruction of the term ‘text’. In his essay “Nonlinearity and Literary Theory,”  
he drafts an ontology for a large variety of such texts. There are are two separate, but as we will  
see, deeply interrelated perspectives on the notion of a ‘text’: The informative aspect describes the 
physical object that makes up or carries the text, and the attached social codes which define how 
it should be read in terms of codices of use, while the interpretable aspect defines what the indi-
vidual reader takes out of it, “that which makes it worth reading.”140 From a historical rather than 
terminological viewpoint, he then identifies three conceptions of a “proper text”, which are com-
monly shared by literature theorists as well as readers:
“(1) A text is what you read, the words and phrases that you see before your eyes and the 
meanings they produce in your head. (2) A text is a message, imbued with the values and 
intentions of a specific writer/genre/culture. (3) A text is a fixed sequence of constituents 
(beginning, middle, end) that cannot change, although its interpretations might.”141
These attributes require the existence of a narrator, who designed the informative aspect prior to 
the consumption by the narratee, who is in turn only to interpret the text. Removing, adding or 
rearranging the pieces of such a text would violate this precept, which reveals the notion of a  
“text ‘behind-the-text’ as more real than the physical object”.142 The author is considered to be the 
only one who can shape this ideal text in a way that is suitable to facilitate a meaningful interpre-
tation.
This kind of text “is the only text in which the metaphysics of a real reader has any credibility  
and the only text in which the reader can exist as a reducible, accountable figure.” 143 There is a 
clear distinction and hierarchic relationship between reader and author. The latter is also the nar-
rator, in possession of the proper text ‘behind-the-text’ and has laid it out in the specific and only 
way in which it is meant to be consumed by the reader, who, being the narratee, can rest assured  
that the plot is told exactly in the way it is meant to be told. In effect, a ‘proper text’ is a rather  





rigid version of the informative aspect, one which safely “conducts the script from the text to the  
mind of the beholder.”144
As nonlinear texts do not match this notion of a fixed informative, Aarseth proposes that “we 
should study text as information.”145 This might be the widest imaginable definition of text, but “it 
might give us a more stable object to work with in a time when our old paper-based paradigms 
seem to disperse on the winds of the rhetoric of the new technologies.”146
Where Ricoeur and Bruner are interested in the ‘heterogeneous elements’ of the interpretable 
aspect,  Aarseth’s focus lies primarily on the effect that different (structural)  conditions of the 
informative aspect can have on the interpretable. These aspects are, quite obviously, interdepen-
dent: In a hypertext with links between different chunks of text (read: of the informative), the 
interpretable will change depending on the link the user chooses to follow. The inverse scenario, in 
which the  interpretable interferes with the  informative, might not be as plausible, but certainly 
imaginable, for instance in a text that orders “us to go at once to page 50 for further instructions  
and skip the intervening pages that, we are told, have been contaminated by subversive direc-
tions.”147
Due to this interrelatedness, an understanding of the properties and effects of the informative  
is necessary to effectively ‘conduct’ a given historical interpretable to any text’s recipients.  This 
should hold true for any interpretable, but especially so for the, from a historiological perspective,  
largely uncharted territory such as interactive narrative and narrative with respect to new media.
4.1 Points of connection between historiography, media, and 
textual ontology
Before coming to Aarseth’s ontology and enumerating some more prototypical examples of vary-
ing degrees of nonlinearity, there are (at least) three concerns about using his framework as the  
foundation for this thesis’ discussion of the structural properties of historical narratives that I  
would like to clear.
First, the relation between Aarseth’s notion of informative and the shape which Ricoeur’s hetero-
geneous parts of mimesis1 take on through emplotment, or in Bruner’s terms respectively, the 
shape of events and explications of deviations in the context of the symbolic order of culture,  
might not be self-evident. As has been said, Bruner and Ricoeur are only really interested in the  
interpretable, and can afford to be largely agnostic about its carrier. Mimesis1, or the symbolic 
144 Ibid., 763




order  of culture,  are obviously medium-independent.  Culture  itself  cannot be reduced to,  for  
instance, only its literature, only its music, or only its customs, but is being carried by and dis-
persed across all imaginable kinds of media. It stands to reason that all kinds of media should also 
be able to carry a narrative in such a way that it can be (re-)introduced into that same system in 
mimesis3. The circularity of the mimetic activity would otherwise require an intermediary step to 
translate, for instance, a purely written narrative back into the medium-independent mimesis 1. 
Neither Ricoeur nor Bruner discuss the risk of this medial discontinuity. Conversely, through laying  
out their frameworks for creating and receiving narratives, they also define criteria such as fol-
lowability for those narratives. In the context of this thesis, this can be understood as the (sole) 
implicit requirement for the informative: Only that which is able to convey the interpretable in  
such a way that a narrative can be constructed from it, is a suitable informative. As already hinted 
to by Aarseth, it is the ‘mind of the beholder’ that ultimately interfaces informative and inter-
pretable (and therefore, by extension, the symbolic order of culture), but it remains to be seen  
what the mechanics of this interface are.
Second, one might ask for the reason to use such a wide ontology as Aarseth’s. While even a fixed 
informative can invoke nonlinear narration, it is certainly not very common, not in fiction, but  
especially not in historiography. The answer is twofold: Since this thesis seeks for ways to convey 
interpretations of the past not only with veracity, but also in a way that takes into account and 
exploits the fundamental human, folk-psychological mode of ordering and interpreting events in 
the world, all, and especially new(er) medial possibilities should be considered, if only in principle. I  
also want to argue (somewhat preliminarily here) that using more immersive and/or more engag-
ing media need not be seen per se as a threat to a thorough and critical understanding of the 
relationship between the past and its narratives. However, Ricoeur and Bruner only speak about 
the interpretable of historical narratives and are agnostic about the media, but certainly not about  
the linearity of the informative. One should not attempt to simply transfer their frameworks of 
meaning-making about the past into any medium where the informative might not be strictly lin-
ear. The specific means of interaction and interpretation of that respective medium have to be 
taken into account, both in terms of opportunities and caveats. Clyde et. al.’s article bears testi -
mony to this as an attempt to rigidly map scholarly historical writing onto video games.
Lastly, and most importantly, a clear-cut definition of ‘text’ is still missing. What is it that carries  
or transmits the interpretable aspect? The word ‘informative’ certainly suggests that any medium 
which  carries  information  can  be  considered,  as  long  as  this  information  is  interpretable.  As 
already mentioned, Aarseth proposes to view text as information, but also speaks, rather ambigu-
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ously, of text as what is being read, and of the ‘reader’ as one who reads, yet also of the much  
broader binary of “reader/receiver/audience and writer/sender/author.”148 All but one of the exam-
ples against which he tests his ontology are comprised of letters that form phrases or sentences  
that form paragraphs: written text in the traditional sense. The sole exception is an example from 
a personal experience of a film screening in which the reels’ order got mixed up, leaving the audi-
ence somewhat confused and thus revealing their notion of the aforementioned text ‘behind-the-
text’.149 The medium of film, however, is at odds with his definition of text as “an object of verbal  
communication”150 earlier in the essay. I suspect that the main reason for him choosing all the 
other examples is their availability in the year of writing his essay, 1994.
This very loose use of ‘text’ can be found in the writing of other scholars as well, as Eoin Kil-
feather’s  account  of  George  Landow’s  theory  of  hypertext  shows:  “[He] makes  no distinction 
between the terms 'hypertext' and 'hypermedia'. Hypermedia […] may also incorporate visual and 
auditory elements such as graphics, pictures, video and sound – and may in fact contain no text at 
all. In fact Landow uses the terms hypertext and hypermedia interchangeably.”151
It is instructive to use the term ‘media’ rather than ‘text’, both to avoid confusing Aarseth’s  
sense of it with its more vernacular meaning as a string of graphemes on a flat surface, and to  
truly do justice to the variety of what has been tentatively called the ‘carrier of information’. This 
is not to say that only so-called new media could have unusual informative aspects, which in turn 
affect the interpretable. Aarseth’s exemplifies this with a text (in the vernacular sense) that is  
“forking out in two directions on a surface, forcing its witness […] to choose one path in prefer-
ence to another.”152
However, the shift from ‘text’ to ‘media’ does not yet answer the original question. One could 
follow Aarseth’s suggestion and regard media (and not text) as information, or simply equate it  
with  the  informative  aspect,  but  that  would  do  nothing  to  elucidate  the  manifold  relations 
between the forms of media – such as Landow’s visual and auditory elements – and their eventual  
impact on the interpretable aspect. As will become clear when laying out the elements and prop-
erties of Aarseth’s ontology, there is no reason to doubt the applicability of the aspects ‘informa-
tive’ and ‘interpretable’ to other media (for instance, still or moving images, sound, haptic, virtual  
or augmented reality) in principle. The utility of Aarseth’s ontology for this thesis lies in the for-
mulation of different relations between the interpretable and the informative aspects. However, to 
avoid a too narrow perspective stemming from the vernacular understanding of ‘text’, a compre-
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out.
Before discussing any ‘manifestation’ or ‘implementation’ of historical storytelling in a medium 
like,  for  instance,  location-based  video  games,  with  specific  medial  components  like  moving 
images, sound, input devices, or augmented reality elements, two more steps will have to be made:
First, I will present Lars Elleström’s framework of the modalities of media, which divides this  
term into distinct, yet interdependent aspects. As it is intended to be applicable to all kinds of  
media, one could ask again for the utility of such a wide model. The answer is fundamentally the 
same as above: Working within a narrower scope than the one Elleström’s framework provides 
might unintentionally veil important aspects of conveying historical interpretation through vari-
ous media, because their possible potentialities and implications might not be realized.
Then, after having laid the groundwork, I will discuss the implications for historical storytelling 
in terms of Aarseth’s ontology of textual forms. This will serve to arrive at a more precise concep-
tion of the structural properties of the informative, which can then be used as a guideline for the  
actual creation of media that conveys historical narratives.
I refrain from the more simple and certainly more familiar pair of ‘content’ and ‘form’, in which  
historical narratives would occupy the role of content, and the means of conveying them the role  
of form. For historical narratives, Hayden White already examined how one affects and structures 
the other in the aptly named  The Content of the Form.153 The previous paragraphs have been 
meant to show that subsuming the multitude of medial arrangements and modes of interactivity  
at one’s disposal under the one term of ‘form’ will not do them justice. ‘Content’, then, suggests  
the applicability  of the aforementioned notion of text ‘behind-the-text’  for  different  sorts  of 
media – an unchanging interpretable that might be delivered or ‘conducted’ in different ways via  
different channels, while fundamentally staying the same, along with its reception.
On a final terminological side note, the word ‘content’ has gained a new connotation that has  
to do with whether it is electronically mediated or not: “A digital dualism has been infused in the  
idea of content, if not the content itself. The 'online' gets treated different from the 'offline', even 
if our experiences are similar.” While the content of traditional media might be consumed, content  
of digital  media is expected to be made for “mere consumption,”154 requiring less engagement 
from the consumer and thus having less or no impact on them.
4.2 Modes and modalities of media
In the introductory chapter of  Media Borders, Multimodality and Intermediality,  Lars Elleström 
153 White 1987
154 PBS Idea Channel, 2017
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proposes to divide the notion of ‘medium’ into different aspects that all have to be considered if  
one is to understand or define it. Similar to my problematizing of the conflation of a medium’s 
information with its means of conveyance, he criticizes that “materiality of media is generally not 
distinguished from the  perception of media” and gives a strikingly pellucid explanation for this 
struggle “to separate the two. For human beings, nothing exists outside perception.”155 Also, simi-
lar to Aarseth identifying preconceived notions like the text ‘behind-the-text’ that influence our 
interpretation of their informative, he criticizes that scholarly efforts “as a rule start off with con-
ceptual units such as image, music, text, film, verbal media or visual media” 156 when attempting to 
describe relations between different media.
His solution to these problems of different conceptions of media are laid out on the next pages.  
Instead of reiterating the bulk of his essay, I chose to compile a diagram (see Illustration 3: The
modalities and modes of media by Elleström (2010a)), especially to visualize the various relations 
between the elements of his model. The following paragraphs should thus primarily be seen as 
instructions to read that diagram. I will refer to the model throughout the following chapters and 
make references to Elleström’s terminology that can be found in the diagram.
Modalities
Elleström begins by dividing any medial expression into different  modalities, which are interre-
lated and “build  a  medial  complex integrating materiality,  perception and cognition.” 157 Those 
modalities are called  material,  sensorial,  spatiotemporal,  and  semiotic,  and in that order they 
range from the tangible to the perceptual to the conceptual. In that sense, each modality builds 
on  top  of  the  former,  although  this  does  not  happen  in  a  straightforward  hierarchical  way,  
because perception and conception happen largely unwittingly and order and interpret sensorial  
and perceptual input, respectively, to the aforementioned effect of all of the world already being  
mediated by our sensorial, perceptual and conceptual capacities, without us realizing the interme-
diate steps taken. Although there is this amalgamation between the modalities, Elleström main-
tains that “that there is a point in starting with the material aspect since this is what would exist  
even if all living creatures were to be wiped out from the surface of our planet,” and in ending  
with the semiotic modality “since it can be said to include, or at least be based on, the other  
three.”158 In the diagram, the modalities are stacked accordingly and their relations are illustrated 
by arrows and their respective captions.






Each modality, then, has a number of distinct modes of operation. Those modes are printed in ital-
ics inside of each modality, except in the case of the spatiotemporal modality where they are plot-
ted out in a table. For this spatiotemporal modality Elleström follows “Kant's idea that space and  
time are a priori sensory intuitions[…]. Thus, because of cognitive conditions, all media necessarily 
in some respect receive both spatial and temporal qualities.”159 The table’s two-dimensional struc-
ture thus reflects the dimensions of space and time. The cells’ contents are examples of media that 
fall under the respective spatiotemporal modes. Hypertexts, for instance, consist of chunks of text  
that  are  displayed  on  a  demarcated  two-dimensional  surface.  The  chunks  themselves  are  
immutable but can be displayed in a nonlinear order. Hypertexts, therefore, are partially fixed,  
two-dimensional media.
The examples with backgrounds shaded in gray within those cells are examples of virtual, or 
represented modes of the  spatiotemporal  modality.  This  is  due to  the cognitive  capacity  that 
allows for an “interpretation of a medium” in which “the represented spatiotemporal state is not 
the same as the spatiotemporal state of the  representing material modality considered through 
the spatiotemporal modality.”160 For example, a photograph is two-dimensional and static in its 
material modality, but can have represented spatial depth due to the depth-of-field effect, or a 
represented partially fixed sequentiality due to blurred, stretched, or transparent objects.
Aspects
The modes of all modalities jointly “form the specific character of every medium,”161 but only in its 
basic aspect. Since all media (or at least their perception and use) are situated in a sociocultural 
context, our relation to them is typically informed by conventions and discourses, as well as the  
knowledge about the specific historical context in which they originated. This is what Elleström 
calls the  qualified aspects of media. The effect are such medial differences as the one between 
‘visual text’ and ‘visual literature’: The latter “is heavily dependent on the two qualifying aspects”,  
while the former “is a sort of medium that can largely be defined by way of only the four modali-
ties.”162 Thus, visual text can become visual literature in the eye of the beholder if one has and  
applies  the  knowledge of  its  situatedness  and codices  of  use.  Crucially,  this  also  entails  that 
“'[l]iterature' and 'alphabetic text' are not media as such” in Elleström’s model – the various possi -






‘auditory literature’ (based on ‘auditory text’) or ‘tactile text’ (e.g. braille) are omitted.163 As has 
been said, one can not expect to get a full picture of any medium without considering all of its  
modalities. The qualifying aspects of a medium can greatly influence the perception of and expec-
tations toward  its  otherwise  somewhat naive basic  aspects.  In  the medium of ‘pop song’,  for 
instance, the two the basic media ‘auditory text’ and ‘non-verbal sound’ are expected to have cer-
tain qualities that “confer on them not only the value of 'lyrics' and 'music' but also of 'pop lyrics'  
and 'pop music'.”164 The specificity of those qualities could be narrowed down even further if one 
were to define certain genres within pop music.
Technical media
Finally,  all  qualified  and  basic  media  must  be  realized  or  implemented  through  a  technical  
medium. This is not the be confused with the material modality of the medium, which in itself is  
still latent, and should rather be considered as a set of more or less strict requirements which have 
to be met by the technical medium implementing it. “For instance, the material modality of sculp-
ture consists of (an idea of) extended, generally solid materiality that can be realized by technical  
media such as bronze, stone or plaster.”165 A technical medium is thus not tied to one single basic 
or qualified medium, but can “be defined in relation to the range of basic media they have the  
capacity of mediating.”166 The qualifying aspects of a medium can also include certain technical  
media if they play a role in the medium’s historical or cultural significance. One might for instance 
define oil paintings as a qualified medium, since it has “unique aesthetic qualities linked to the  
technical medium of oil colour, which was invented and developed at a certain time and in a cer-
tain cultural context.”167 It follows that a painting made with a technical medium other than real  
oil, but that has all the relevant properties to endow the respective instance of that medium with  
the same qualitative characteristics, should, for all intents and purposes, still be considered an oil  
painting.
Without delving into the field of semiotics (yet), it should be safe to conclude that, in media  
that can be said to facilitate narration, emplotment is situated in the semiotic modality. Elleström  
divides this modality based on the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce into pictorial thinking 
and propositional thinking: The two sign-functions of pictorial thinking are the indexical, “based 
on cause and closeness”, and the iconic, “based on similarity.” As has been discussed in chapter 3







tively. They refer to the “natural” or “outer world”, whereas the sole sign-function of propositional 
thinking is the symbolic, referring to the “conventional or arbitrary.”168 For these reasons I will 
later argue that, within the semiotic modality, it is predominantly the mode of pictorial thinking, 
as opposed to propositional thinking, which facilitates historical narratives.
The question for the conveyance of a sound historical interpretation of the past, posed at the very  
beginning of this chapter, can thus be reformulated as follows: “What are the desired semiotic  
qualities (of any given medium) to effectively convey or facilitate a veracious interpretation of the 
past?" The scope of this thesis is thus to define such qualities. Just like the material modality is in  
principle agnostic as to which technical medium is used to implement it, those semiotic qualities 
should be medium-independent in principle and only act as more or less strict and more or less  
well-defined requirements for any such medium. It would be too presumptuous an attempt to 




Illustration 3: The modalities and modes of media by Elleström (2010a)
4.3 An ontology of nonlinear media
Returning to Aarseth’s essay, it can now be said that his interest lies primarily in the relation 
between the material modality and the semiotic modality, namely in the way the different modes 
of the former, implemented by technical media and perceived through the sensorial  and spa-
tiotemporal modalities, connect to and shape the modes of the latter.
His ontology is draft-like, in that it is by no means an exhaustive description of all conceivable 
categories  of medial  configurations beyond the strictly  linear  one.  Different  configurations of 
nonlinear texts were nascent in 1994, and still are today, largely driven by technological evolution.  
The three core elements he proposes to describe any medium are:
textons an arbitrarily long string of graphemes, identified by its relation to the other 
textons, constrained and separated by the conventions or mechanisms of their 
mother medium
scriptons “an unbroken sequence of one or more textons as they are projected” by the 
medium
traversal functions “the conventions and mechanisms that combine and project textons as scriptons to 
the user”169
Table 1: Textual core elements
Although Aarseth makes another recourse to written text by speaking of ‘strings’ of ‘graphemes’, I 
want to stress again that there is no reason to restrict this ontology to that narrow conception of 
text. As he claims himself, this “model is equally applicable to a child's interrogation of a story -
teller, a researcher's conversation with an artificial intelligence program, or a radio broadcast.”170
Then, instead of attempting to create an inventory of traversal functions, he lists a “tentative  
and pragmatic” set of properties that emerge from such functions:171
topology linear  nonlinear sequence of the script↔ nonlinear sequence of the script
dynamics static  dynamic interpretable of the script↔ nonlinear sequence of the script
determinability determinate  indeterminate traversal function↔ nonlinear sequence of the script
transiency the text’s intransient  transient relationship to time↔ nonlinear sequence of the script
maneuverability in terms of openness of access to the text’s parts: completely controlled access  → 
conditional access  explicit access  open access→ → 
user-functionality the interpretative function of the reader  the feedback functions of the user (more↔ nonlinear sequence of the script  
on this later)
Table 2: Tentative textual properties
Those properties can be exemplified as follows (see also  Table 3: Examples of static media): The 
aforementioned ‘proper text’ with a ‘real reader’ can be categorized as linear,  intransient,  deter-





minate, with static interpretable,  open access and a solely interpretative user function. The sec-
ond hitherto used example, that of the forking out text, already qualifies as a nonlinear text, being 
nonlinear,  intransient,  determinate (because the adjacent scriptons of each given scripton are 
always the same), with a  static interpretable,  open access,  and an  interpretative as well as an 
explorative user function.
The third, that of the film whose reels got mixed up in a screening, would be linear, transient, 
determinate,  with  static  interpretable and  completely controlled access.  However, as Aarseth’s 
example illustrated, the maneuverability is only (completely) controlled for the audience in the 
movie theater, but not for the projectionist, who has in fact  open access to all the reels, and 
could, in principle, play them in any order. From their perspective, the reels could each be consid-
ered as one scripton, whereas the audience would – and should, in the conception of a ‘proper 
text’ – perceive the whole film as one continuous scripton. In the setting of the movie theater,  
with  static  interpretable  and  only  one  (perceivable)  scripton,  the  whole  film  should  also  be  
regarded as one texton. Conversely, in a DVD or BluRay release of the same film, the disc’s menu  
might allow open access to the individual scenes, displayed as scriptons, each containing one tex-
ton. If the user chose to watch one full act instead, that would compile a number of textons into  
one larger (but still determinate) scripton.
Proper text Forking out text Film (movie theater) Film (DVD)
topology linear nonlinear linear linear
dynamics static static static static
determinability determinate determinate determinate determinate
transiency intransient intransient transient transient
maneuverability open access open access controlled access open access
user-functionality interpretative interpretative, 
explorative
interpretative interpretative
Table 3: Examples of static media
This last example should illustrate again how different medial configurations can “conduct”172 the 
same interpretable aspect in different ways – except that we cannot actually speak of the very  
same interpretable anymore, since it is changed to a smaller or greater extend by its respective 
informative. My struggle to find the right terms here is symptomatic of the notion of text ‘behind-
the-text’,  which  would  demand the  ‘actual’  film,  and  thus  its  interpretation,  to  be  the  same 
regardless of its carrying medium, which it clearly is not. “We do this out of lack of respect for the 
copy; it appears to misrepresent the ‘real’ text, even if such a thing may never have existed. In  
short, we prefer the imagined integrity of a metaphysical object to the stable version that we 
172 Ibid., 763
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observe.”173 With Elleström we can say that Aarseth criticizes how established categories some-
times exclude outliers and exceptions:
Our expectations as to what the medium of film is like and how it is meant to be perceived, all  
encoded in the qualifying aspect, can get in the way of an ingenious reception of the (instance of  
a) medium as it presents itself in its basic aspect. For example, the institution of ‘cinema’, includ -
ing the ritual of sitting in a dark screening room in which the film is presented as one texton, can  
be described as an integral part of “the operational qualifying aspect” of the medium ‘cinema’ 
even though it did not come about “the day the technique was invented.”174 This (historically con-
tingent) qualifying aspect cannot simply be transferred for experiencing the interpretable of the  
‘same’ film on DVD, except if one defines its material modality so loosely that both the technical 
media of ‘cinema’ and ‘DVD’ would meet the requirements equally well. Therefore there will always 
be a necessity for renegotiating whether a new technical medium in fact educes a new basic  
medium (and thus probably a new qualified medium). Where Aarseth would rather do away with 
any  such  definition  altogether,  Elleström just  highlights  that  “the  relation  between  technical 
media and the material modality is very tight: the theoretical distinction can and must be made, 
but in practice the two cannot be separated.”175
4.3.1 The technical configuration of dynamic media and its effects
Although his essay is strictly about fiction, Aarseth's attack, at its core, goes against the very same 
Aristotelian notion which Ricoeur had to challenge in order to justify his framework of a narrative 
mode of history. According to it the coherence, and thus the followability, of a narrative can only  
be achieved if each “contingency” is subject to “the poet's control.” 176 From this point, however, 
their considerations follow entirely different paths:
Ricoeur  is  only  concerned  with  injecting  a  scientifically  justifiable  epistemology  into  the  
moment of explaining, and thus resolving, narrative contingencies. To it he attributes the dichoto-
mous role of bearing that potential for critical discontinuity which makes historical explanations 
possible, as well as bringing about the peripeteia that reflects the fundamental aporia of being-in-
time, and thus make the narrative worth following. By merging the Confessions and the Poetics, 
he answers the question of the followability of a story in the context of a fixed informative, and 
has, in the subsequent chapters, nothing to say about questions that might arise from different 
technical configurations of Aarseth's notion of media (or ‘text’ in his terms).177
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Aarseth, instead, asks about the structure of texts, their malleability and interactivity, and how 
this changes the way they are received (not read). Any text without a fixed informative must raise 
the question whether all of its versions or iterations make for good stories. How stark can the con-
tingencies get? How convincing can the explanations to resolve those contingencies be? As Aristo-
tle said, what is acceptable (i.e. what can be accepted after all) in a narrative is entirely subjective, 
but what Aarseth puts forth might demand a lot of distention from this human capacity. He 
addresses this problem only in part: “The user is responsible for the images, but the text is in con-
trol and can dictate changes without any deference to external logic.”178 This works due to the 
‘principle of minimal departure’, as Marie-Laure Ryan calls it. It states that
“when readers construct fictional worlds, they fill in the gaps [...] in the text by assuming the 
similarity of the fictional world to their own experiential reality. This model can only be 
overruled by the text itself; thus, if a text mentions a blue deer, the reader will imagine an 
animal that resembles her idea of real deer in all respects other than the color.”179
Aarseth concludes that therefore, “fictions are neither logical nor illogical.” The description of blue 
deer is accepted “because nobody is 'there' to contradict it. A fiction, then, is not about something 
that does not exist but about something that it is meaningless to contradict.”180 This is not to say 
that those texts can be self-contradictory, but whether they appear to be coherent to their users 
(i.e. appear to avoid contingencies, or resolve them) is an entirely different matter. For his concep-
tion of nonlinear literature Aarseth has to do away with the Aristotelian notion of ‘the poet’s con-
trol’. He consequently prefers the term 'experience' of such media.
It stands to reason that, if recipients of fictional narratives spontaneously employ the ‘principle 
of  minimal  departure’,  they  will  do  so  for  historical  narratives  as  well  –  after  all,  those  are 
expected to be accounts of the real world. Historical narratives will thus have to be context-sensi-
tive with regard to the recipients’ cultural background and overrule their implicit assumptions 
about the past. I had already put forth this notion with regard to Troy and Ephesus in 3.4 Narra-
tive vs. nomological understanding and knowledge retention. What techniques might be feasible 
to do so will be discussed later. For now it is only worth noting that there might be a slight risk of  
creating too many or too stark contingencies (within a given amount of time), thus intervening  
too drastically in the narratee’s world building efforts and rendering the narrative unfollowable.  
Aiming at providing (mere) ‘experience’ of media, rather than narrative, would mean to throw out 
the baby with the bathwater.
However, I would argue that contingencies in historical narratives need not be regarded a nec-
essary evil that is only to be employed where inevitable. Not only make they the narrative inter-
178 Aarseth 2003, 777
179 Herman et. al. 2005, 447
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esting in the first place, they also have the capacity to create more effective learning experiences.  
As described in my account of the helping experiment (see section 3.4 Narrative vs. nomological
understanding and knowledge retention), it was precisely that contingency in the story given to 
the third study’s participants which had a positive educational impact.
4.3.2 Interactivity in hypertext and cybertext
Hypertext and cybertext are two categories of such media in which the contingencies will  be 
harder to resolve, and thus the conclusions (if there are any) harder to accept. They are certainly 
not the only categories of nonlinear texts – the aforementioned example of a text forking out on 
a surface would fall in neither – but at least among the more common ones. Thus, these categories  
are pragmatic as well,  like the aforementioned six properties of texts with which they can be  
described. I will use them here to exemplify the effects that different combinations of said proper-
ties can have on the activity of receiving a medium.
Hypertext
Hypertext is characterized by “explicit links”181 (in contrast to hidden ones) between its textons. 
The sole technical difference from the discussed linear text lies in this traversal function, which  
only allows jumps from one scripton to another, but only to those that are offered to the user, and 
typically not to any ‘right’ or ‘correct’ one. Thus, “the main feature of hypertext is discontinuity”182 
in a twofold sense: By following a link, the scripton displayed to the user is replaced by a new one,  
suddenly and without any spatial continuity. The change from the recipient’s perspective is pro-
found: The semantic connection between two such adjacent scriptons is less clear, due to this  
technical arrangement (the jump), but also because the user cannot be certain that their reading 
activity  is  following any,  or preferably  the  only,  path to a  meaningful  conclusion.  Those  two 
effects are not to be conflated:  Discontinuity,  brought about by the ‘jump’ between adjacent 
scriptons, is primarily a syntactic problem and does affect the followability of a narrative only 
indirectly. Conversely, the contingencies, caused by the user’s decision to follow a given link, are  
entirely a question of semantics.
One fundamental impact on the narrative’s coherence becomes apparent right away: The key  
difference that Ricoeur had identified between (fictional) narrative and historical narrative is that,  
while for the former the rule “to narrate what has happened is already to explain why it hap-
pened”183 does apply, it does not for the latter: “Every historical narrative is looking for an expla-
181 Ibid., 768
182 Ibid., 771
183 Ricoeur 1984, 154
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nation to incorporate into itself, because it has failed to explain itself.”184 In hypertext, however, 
neither  the  smooth  succession  of  events  that  allow  equating  ‘one  after  the  other’  and  ‘one 
because of the other’ is provided, nor are the explanations that promise to eliminate contingen-
cies.
The former problem might be mitigated by more elaborate methods of displaying and swapping 
the interpretable’s scriptons than the rather lumbering ‘jump’ that Aarseth described in 1994. The 
latter could be mitigated if the text’s author sees to carefully designing an intricate traversal  
function that guarantees at least a semantically seamless reception of the text, i.e. one that mini -
mizes the contingencies in the informative. How explanations in a hypothetical historical hyper-
text could be provided will have to be discussed later.
In any case, the responsibility for explaining and thus resolving contingencies, which would fall  
to the author in a traditional, linear text, is now shared between author and user, but must ulti-
mately be performed on the user’s side. It cannot be said that they would simply have to invoke a  
more resilient version of the ‘nomological’ (Ricoeur), or ‘puzzle-solving’ (Bruner) mode of under-
standing to resolve those contingencies in the narrative – something else has changed in their role 
as recipients: The  "understanding (beyond trivial) of a nonlinear text can never be consummate 
understanding, because the realization of its script (and not just its meaning) belongs to the indi -
vidual user, who is acutely aware of his or her own constructive participation."185 Thus, a subset of 
the user-functionality, more precisely of the user’s feedback functionality, has the be introduced 
to describe nonlinear texts properly:186
The explorative function in which the user decides which “path” to take
The role-playing function in which the user assumes strategic responsibility for a “character” in a 
“world” described in the narrative
The configurative function in which textons and/or traversal functions are in part chosen and/or 
designed by the user
The poetic function in which the user’s actions, dialogue, or design are aesthetically motivated
Table 4: User feedback functions
Apart from the already mentioned properties of  nonlinearity and maneuverability through the 
explicit link, hypertext can be classified as  determinate and  intratextonically dynamic (meaning 
that the textons do not change, but their arrangement does). The user assumes an  explorative  
feedback function and with it the responsibility of realizing the medium’s script. (See also Table 5:
Examples of dynamic media.)
184 Ibid., 155
185 Aarseth 1994, 769, emphasis mine
186 Ibid., 768, converted into table format
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Cybertext
Cybertexts are self-changing texts whose “scriptons and traversal functions are controlled by an  
immanent cybernetic agent, either mechanical or human”187; this agent could be a computer, or 
for instance the game master in a pen-and-paper role-playing game. Those texts are at least non-
linear with a dynamic interpretable, but could also be transient, indeterminate and their textons 
entirely controlledly accessible.
The  most  important  distinction  Aarseth  makes  is  between  determinate  and  indeterminate 
cybertexts. Determinate cybertexts have predictable behavior, in that the user’s actions will always 
have the same effects (i.e. yield the same scriptons), or, if they are transient, the passing of time 
will always change their state in the same way. Conversely,  indeterminate cybertexts cannot be 
predicted and are typically  textonically dynamic: the arrangement, but also the amount or con-
tent of textons themselves can vary.
Aarseth’s example of a determinate cybertext is the “classic game Adventure, the first of the 
highly popular computer game genre”188 of the same name, in which the user interacts with the 
cybernetic agent to explore the ‘game world’ as an avatar: They try out different actions to see 
what the text will yield, but contrary to hypertext, might be denied access to certain (or even 
most) scriptons, either temporarily or permanently. The cybernetic agent gives account of the cur-
rent position of the user in the text, the effects of the user’s actions, and guides them via affor-
dances. Just as the followability of a hypertext depends on its traversal function’s capacity to 
afford a (semantically) seamless reading/receiving process, the degree of followability in a cyber-
text depends largely on the capacity of the cybernetic agent to guide the user along a meaningful  
path,  in  the  sense  that  the  user’s  actions  yield  a  narrative  string  that  is  worth following by  
Ricoeur’s standards. The interaction between user and the text/the medium in Adventure is a back 
and forth of cybernetically generated statements and commands by the user, which may read as 
follows:189
You are inside a building, a well house for a large spring.
There are some keys on the ground here.
There is a shiny brass lamp nearby.
There is food here.





You are at end of road again.
DOWN






At your feet all the water of the stream splashes into a 2-inch slit in the rock. Downstream the 
streambed is bare rock.
DOWNSTREAM
You don't fit through a two-inch slit!
Just as in hypertext, the user participates actively in constructing a determinate cybertext’s script.  
However, while in hypertext a number of possible plots are already laid out for the user, who, by  
choosing one link over another, only makes them appear in a distinct order and thus creates a nar-
rative, the user of a determinate cybertext also has to be active in re-creating those plots. Their  
actions might,  or might not, evoke the next scripton in a predefined plot with a (narratively) 
meaningful outcome. “In fiction the story determines and hides behind the plot, which produces 
the action,  whereas in [determinate]  cybertext the plot itself  is  hidden,  and so the discursive  
causality is reversed: action determines (or seeks in vain for) the plot.”190 With other words, in 
hypertext there is nothing the user ‘does in’ the script of a hypertext, while in cybertext there is 
no script if the user ‘does nothing’. What the user will (attempt to) ‘do in’ the cybertext is largely  
guided by the aforementioned affordances, or hints by the cybernetic agent as to what can be  
done in the respective situation (the state) in the interpretable. In the above block quotation, the 
enumeration of things in the well house are all very overt affordances.
Adventure can be classified as determinate,  intransient,  intratextonically dynamic, with com-
pletely controlled access to its scriptons, and not just an explorative, but also a role-playing user 
feedback function that is reflective of the user’s direct involvement in the interpretable (c.f. Table
5: Examples of dynamic media).
There are a number of conceivable strategies to minimize the contingencies that will inevitably 
arise from the limited number of available plots in a determinate cybertext. The first follows so  
naturally from the user’s actions ‘in’ the interpretable that it is easily overseen: The conflation of 
user, recipient, and main character. Text-based media like  Adventure provoke this conflation by 
simply addressing the user with the pronoun ‘you’, while e.g. video games with a 3D environment 
typically display the ‘world’ (of the cybertext) with an over-the-shoulder third-person view of the 
avatar, or directly from their first-person perspective. The user will be inclined to perform actions  
that are consistent with the avatar’s character, with whom they identify, and which are thus con-
sistent with the interpretable presented to them. With other words, they will tend to ‘do’ what 
‘makes sense’ for the character they are playing, which, in turn, is more likely to yield a meaning -
ful narrative.191
Apart from that conflation, the two most frequently used strategies to minimize contingencies  
190 Ibid., 774
191 Other psychological and even neurophysiological reasons that allow for this conflation exist but must be 
omitted here.
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are the spatial restriction and the death of the avatar. On its face, both are an embarrassment 
waiting to happen, because they are not as elegantly inscribed in the very relation between the 
medium’s user and cybernetic agent, but instead expressions of the technical restrictions that are 
the limited number of available plots, or the limited number of meaningful actions the cybernetic  
agent can facilitate. The interpretable’s avatar must be confined to a – metaphorically – limited  
‘space’ in which the author of a determinate cybertext can create a consistent and, crucially, finite  
number of plots. This limitation of the informative aspect of a medium is often expressed in the  
interpretable as the – now literally – confined space of ‘levels’ or ‘maps’ like isolated islands or 
closed off facilities that the main character cannot leave. This spatial restriction is joined by its  
temporal counterpart, the death of the avatar: It expresses, again through the interpretable, that  
the user has reached a ‘dead end’ for the avatar’s available plots and thus the time of the narra -
tion (but not the narrative!) has to be terminated.
Since we already crossed the – admittedly faint – line between texts and games, it is now war-
ranted to recur to the MDA framework (mechanics, dynamics, aesthetics) that was briefly intro-
duced in 2 Intersecting historical epistemologies and digital games. Through this lens, the behav-
ioral capacities of the cybernetic agent can be called the mechanics of a game. The two strategies 
to minimize contingencies just laid out can then be seen as strikingly direct reflections of the  
mechanics’ shortcomings in the aesthetics of a game.
Especially early determinate cybertexts like Adventure suffered from such crude mechanics to 
the effect that the “user could only fill, or more typically fail to fill the narrow track of the text's 
hidden ‘plot’,”192 as Aarseth notes. Two more recent examples which subvert this conundrum shall 
be presented here briefly.
The first one is the action-adventure God of War III,193 which subverts the conflation of user, 
recipient, and main character. Set in an alternative version of ancient Greece and loosely based on  
Greek mythology, the  God of War franchise tells the story of Kratos, a Spartan warrior who is 
tricked by Ares, the God of War, into killing his own family. In trying to take revenge on Ares and  
get relief from his grief, Kratos eventually upends the rule of the gods and thus plunges the uni-
verse into chaos. There are no plots that allow for a deviant conclusion of the game, and the mis-
ery that Kratos causes, although spectacularly staged, is neither justified nor glorified. On the con-
trary, Kratos’ victims are presented in an empathic way, so that the recipient’s motivation to see  
his (i.e. Kratos’) goals fulfilled is jeopardized, if not entirely reverted. The subversion is this: Since 
without the recipient participating there can be no action, and the cybernetic agent not allowing 
for action that the recipient can identify with, they are in a challenging situation where they have 
192 Ibid., 775
193 SCE Santa Monica Studio, 2010
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to act ‘in’ the text, but cannot identify with their own actions. The cybernetic agent addresses the  
recipient as ‘you’ (by means of the main character Kratos rather than with visual text), but this  
‘you’ is divorced from the ‘you’ of the user. Playing God of War III thus can feel like being sub-
jected to the recipatory counterpart of an optical illusion with its oscillating perceptions. The  
recipient-’you’ assumes strategic responsibility (cf.  Table 4: User feedback functions) for Kratos, 
but the user-’you’ recoils from doing so, and thus the role-playing user function is stuck halfway 
in its  actualization.  Contrary  to typical  role-playing,  in  God of War III the  agentivity,  one of 
Bruner’s four constituents of narration, does not align main character, recipient, and user.194
The second example is the  Assassin’s Creed195 series, also a franchise of action-adventure video 
games, which subverts the spatial and temporal restrictions of the confined space and the main 
character’s death, respectively. The games’ premise is that one’s ancestors’ memories are inscribed 
in the genetic markup and thus passed down through the generations. A machine called ‘Animus’ 
can access those memories, but rather than simply reading them, the carrier of the genes has to  
relive them by effectively reenacting the ancestor’s life in a simulation. In so wrapping a technical  
present-day meta-narrative around the bulk of the historical narration, it justifies the limitations 
of the cybernetic  agent: Only what the ancestor experienced, and thus only what the games’  
authors created, can be reconstructed by the Animus. Moving outside of the ‘map’ spatially or per-
forming unintended actions (including dying) will cause ‘desynchronization’ with the plot. “Assas-
194 In film or theater this is would amount to a violation of aesthetic distance (Merriam-Webster, s.v. 
“aesthetic distance”, (accessed 2018-01-11), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aesthetic
%20distance). A similar effect can occur through ‘ludonarrative dissonance’ “when a game tells the player one 
thing through its story and environment, and then contradicts it though gameplay” (Makedonski 2012).
195 Ubisoft 2007
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Illustration 4: "An Animus Wall, representing user's inability to sync with the memory"
sin’s Creed doesn’t need to find organic reasons to prevent the player wandering off. Its walls  
aren’t even invisible – they’re crackling fissures that demonstrate the simulation’s opposition to 
your independent action”196 (cf.  Illustration 4: "An Animus Wall, representing user's inability to
sync with the memory"197).
It can be said that overall, the more freedom for the user a cybernetic agent is tasked to facilitate,  
the more challenging it becomes to maintain semantic consistency in the interpretable in terms of  
leading the recipient along meaningful ‘paths’ of an ever growing number of plots. Somewhere 
along this curve of growing complexity is a sort of tipping point at which it becomes more eco-
nomical  to abandon the notion of predefined plots altogether and have the cybernetic  agent 
manage a system that either generates plots dynamically in response to the user’s actions, or to 
connect multiple users within the same informative and let them act and react to one another’s 
actions. Those cybertexts will eventually be be too complex to be determinate.
Finally, located at the far end from ‘proper text’ in the spectrum of Aarseth’s ontology is indeter-
minate cybertext. His example is TinyMUD, created in 1989 as a variant of a MUD (Multi-User  
Dungeon,  later  also  called  Multi-User  Domain),  in  which  users  were  connected  via  the  then 
nascent internet. MUDs share many of their characteristics with the massively multiplayer online 
role-playing games (MMORPGs) which succeeded them: Users take on the role of a character in a  
simulated world, often in a fantasy-style setting with different races, critters, and magical abilities.  
Depending on the variant, they could take on ‘quests’ to follow certain more or less elaborate, pre-
defined plots, fight against one another, explore the simulated world, or simply act out their self-
created role. Contrary to determinate cybertexts, MUDs offered a narratively open-ended space  
“where people could enjoy complete anonymity and freedom from their social and physical selves 
[...], doing things with words that they would normally never do,”198 and thus exceeded any hith-
erto held conception of fiction. What users typed in their role-playing interactions with other 
users in these fictional worlds was at least in part motivated poetically. This ‘behavior’ created  
new, albeit fleeting and narrowly accessible textons for other users. The nature of a MUDs textual  
experience for any given user at any given point in time was so unpredictable that the aforemen-
tioned notion of the text ‘behind-the-text’ proves entirely inapplicable here, and an attempt to  
describe it in terms of narration, let alone narrative, is optimistic at best.
TinyMUD expanded the possibilities of this system even more by allowing its users for the first 
196 GamesRadar+, 2015
197 Assassin’s Creed Wiki, s.v. “Genetic Memory”, (accessed 2018-01-05), http://assassinscreed.wikia.com/wiki/
Genetic_memory?oldid=708134
198 Aarseth 1994, 776
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time to “create their own rooms, objects, and puzzles in the game,"199 thus not only adding new 
textons but expanding the cybernetic agent itself with new traversal functions. It can thus be 
classified as indeterminate, intransient, textonically dynamic, with completely controlled access to 
its scriptons, and explorative,  role-playing,  poetic, and configurative user functions (c.f.  Table 5:
Examples of dynamic media). MUDs share all those properties except for the  configurative user 
function.
Hypertext Adventure TinyMUD
topology nonlinear nonlinear nonlinear
dynamics intratextonically dynamic intratextonically dynamic textonically dynamic
determinability determinate determinate indeterminate
transiency intransient intransient transient










Table 5: Examples of dynamic media
4.4 Possible applications of Aarseth’s ontology
Where could the places Troy, Ephesus and the German Emigration Center fit into this ontology in  
such a way that they might facilitate historical narratives? Certainly not in indeterminate cyber-
texts, because those are unsuited for historical narratives which must rely on a scholarly defensi -
ble (i.e. veracious and verifiable) account of the past. I cannot see a scenario where narratives gen-
erated dynamically or by users would meet those requirements. With artificial general intelligence  
on the horizon, it is not entirely inconceivable that building a cybernetic agent capable of imple-
menting all the processes needed for creating scholarly defensible history (or even guiding its 
users to do so) will one day be possible. Until this is proven to work, I will confine these considera -
tions to hypertext and determinate cybertext.
As apprehended in  1 Introduction, Troy is a challenging case because its archaeological site 
provides very little perceivable material that a narration could work with. The way it was pre-
sented during my visit in 2013 certainly allowed interpretative and explorative user functionality, 
but at least the latter would just be born out of necessity: The site did not guide the visitor in any  
way, like e.g. hypertext would do with explicit links, and did not instruct them with a hypothetical  
199 Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “TinyMUD”, (accessed 2018-01-08), 
h  ttps://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=TinyMUD&oldid=769919582  . Also see 
http://papa.motd.org/cave/tinymud/tinymud.pdf for a full list commands.
- 57 -
set of rules how to go about the exploration either. With Elleström we could say that Troy is lack-
ing a distinct operational qualifying aspect. Even if there might be historical  interpretation, it is 
hard to imagine how the site itself would be perceived as telling a historical narrative. However, I 
had also written that there might be an opportunity lying in the multiple ‘pasts’ that are compet-
ing with one another in Troy.  One option for exploiting this could be a location-based smart 
device app through which the visitor could  follow a (fictional or real) person who lived in Troy,  
and experience a narrative about that person’s life on-site – either in the fashion of a hypertext  
with explicit links and third-person perspective, or through determinate cybertext with a role-
playing user functionality and (thus) first-person perspective. That app, however, would have to 
rely primarily on its own (visual or auditory) material; it could not make very many references to 
the actual site. The tension between different ‘pasts’ could be emphasized by guiding the visitor’s 
attention to one particular structure or column while disregarding everything else in the immedi-
ate proximity if it belonged to another time period. It stands to question how much that would 
add to the visitor’s understanding of the past. Presence at the site might not even be necessary at  
all.
In Ephesus, a similar app would have much more physical material to work with, so the relevant 
challenge lies is choosing and connecting the objects and structures in that space into a verisimi -
lar, veracious, and verifiable narrative, without the visitor becoming distracted by everything that 
does not belong to that narrative. Even though I wrote in 1 Introduction that Ephesus invites the 
mind to graft its own stories onto the physical substrate, I am confident that even e.g. a location-
based audio guide would keep the visitor on the ‘right (narrative) track’. Such audio guides are 
successfully  used by countless museums,  and in my experience visitors follow the instructions 
quite diligently. A location-based audio guide would be akin to a hypertext, except that it would 
use audio as its technical medium and the physical movement of the visitor instead of the ‘jump’  
between scriptons, which had been identified as a potential problem for the interpretable’s coher-
ence in section  4.3 An ontology of nonlinear media.  Other cybertextual implementations that 
would afford a role-playing user functionality could be used to the same effect. The mechanics by 
which the visitor would be kept ‘on track’ there will be discussed in the first section of 5 Nonlinear
narration and historical narratives.
No speculation about possible applications is needed for the case of the German Emigration 
Center. Its environment does fundamentally consist of a string of ‘rooms’ that can only be tra-
versed in a linear fashion. Their order aligns with the order of stages of the emigrant’s journey, i.e.  
with the temporal progression of the process of emigration. I would argue that the linear arrange-
ment of the rooms and the (naturally) linear progression of time makes it obvious for the visitor 
how to move through the museum, room by room. That is to say, the operational qualifying aspect 
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of the museum as a whole needs no explication, and therefore the maneuverability can be entirely 
open in principle.
The contents of each ‘room’, however, cannot only be accessed openly, but lack an overt guid-
ing structure. If each ‘room’ is one scripton, then the contents of the room are its textons. They 
are intratextonically dynamic in a specific, more narrow way: Contrary to Aarseth’s example of 
hypertext, textons in the German Emigration Center do not change, but their arrangement does – 
within the confines of one and the same scripton. Does that not contradict the notion of a scrip-
ton as  “an unbroken sequence of one or more textons  as they are projected”  by the medium? 
Only if the traversal function, “the conventions and mechanisms that combine and project textons 
as scriptons to the user,”200 is defined as belonging to the medium itself. If this is not so, then the 
visitor has a configurative feedback function, which seems to be the case here. Therefore each 
scripton (each ‘room’) acts like a small indeterminate cybertext, strung up within the hypertext of  
the museum as a whole.
5 Nonlinear narration and historical narratives
Although the term ‘plot’ has been used to describe hypertext and cybertext, very little has been 
said about the followability of their interpretable aspect and whether that interpretable aspect 
could actually be considered narrative, or at least narration. Aarseth, as mentioned early in the 
previous chapter, only concerns himself with the manifold possibilities that nonlinear, dynamic 
media brought about and demands a sort of open-minded recipatory attitude. This would mean to 
disregard the established norms and conventions of linear, static media, namely the requirement 
for an unchangeable text ‘behind-the-text’, created by an author, with a defined beginning, mid-
dle, and end.
Two caveats will have to be made with regard to the generality of this demand, one that goes  
back to Ricoeur’s notion of mimesis2, and one that concerns the relation between a medium’s 
material modality and its qualifying aspect.
First, it has been said that mimesis2 grasps together into a narrative the suitable heterogeneous 
elements from the syntagmatic order of culture, and thus resolves the distention of consciousness 
by subsuming (non-coincident) events in time under one ‘thought’ or ‘point’ of a story. The appar-
ent problem with this activity of emplotment in hypertext and cybertext is that the nature of their  
informative aspect might not guarantee a definitive closure of a narrative string, and maybe not  
even a followable path to get there. There can be no narrative if either is missing: ”To understand  
200 c.f. Table 1: Textual core elements
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the story is to understand how and why the successive episodes led to this conclusion.” 201 The fun-
damental Aristotelian insistence on maintaining the ‘poet’s control’ can thus be interpreted as a 
precaution to protect narration from uncontrollable, unresolvable contingencies that could com-
promise its followability and meaningful conclusion – a measure with such great utility and ubiq-
uity that it is seldom questioned.202 Reflecting this notion, and encoded in the qualifying aspect of 
the medium ‘visual literature’ (Elleström) or ‘proper text’ (Aarseth), is the normative convention  
due to which we know how to go about the endeavor of reading and interpreting a book without 
any specific  instructions.203 Were it  not for this,  the  open access to all  its  scriptons that this 
medium allows would leave us clueless as to how to (re)construct a string of events from it that  
could possibly lead to a meaningful conclusion. When taking this into account, the notion of a  
text ‘behind-the-text’,  prone to producing a certain lack of respect for the copy that Aarseth  
lamented, is by no means pointless, at least when one aims for constructing a compelling narra-
tive. As has been said before, receiving a text or any other medium as nothing but unbounded 
‘experience’ would also remove the requirement for a meaningful conclusion, thus the need to  
resolve discintinuities, and thus the need for the ‘ancillary’ historical explanations. For the effort  
of this thesis, this must mean that mimesis2 must also be possible in hypertext and/or cybertext. 
But how?
The answer lies in cybermedia itself. This being fundamentally a discussion of possible tensions  
between a medium’s qualifying aspect and a, for whatever reason,204 unexpected basic  aspect, 
resisting our preconceived normative conventions, leads to the second caveat: Neither Aarseth nor 
Elleström acknowledged that, once a medium’s material modality requires in its implementation 
some programmable device (with Elleström, a programmable technical medium), the distinction 
between the basic aspect and the operational qualifying aspect of that medium becomes less and 
less meaningful. As has been shown in the somewhat technical discussion about more or less intri -
cate traversal functions in hypertext, and strategies like the confined environment and the charac-
ter’s death, both encoded in the cybernetic agent of a cybertext, those normative conventions are 
still very much present and tell us, more or less subtly, how to go about receiving those media. In  
contrast to a ‘proper text’ with its open access, only afforded by the qualifying aspect of litera-
201 Ricoeur 1984, 67
202 Ricoeur did not attack this notion either (cf. the first two paragraphs of section 3.3 The epistemology of 
narratives)
203 As has been shown in the short discussion about the sub-genre ‘pop song’ and its conceivable sub-sub-
genres, media literacy is required to a lesser or greater extend to properly receive instances of the respective 
medium. Even where that literacy is given, any particular work might deviate from the cultural “sediment” to a 
lesser or greater degree and has to be received in its own right rather than through an immutable cookie-
cutter approach. In turn, these “rules [of the qualifying aspect] change under the pressure of innovation” 
stemming from “new works, new, that is, before they, in turn, become typical.” (Ricoeur 1991, 25)
204 Aarseth suggests a few “scales of change in a text’s metaphorphosis:” unintentional, usurpatory, plagiary, 
and subversive (Aarseth 1994, 765)
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ture, the very media themselves can now be programmed to keep their recipients in the bounds of 
(ludologically and/or narratively) meaningful reception by more or less strictly  controlled access 
(cf. Table 5: Examples of dynamic media) to their textons. A user, engaging with an electronically 
implemented interactive medium, often needs none or very little prior knowledge about its opera-
tional qualifying aspect, because it is already inscribed in its very material modality.205
Jeremy Antley was already quoted to this effect in 2 Intersecting historical epistemologies and
digital games by calling digital games ‘closed constructions’. In more complex interactive media 
the causal relation between the qualifying aspects, especially the normative conventions, and the  
material modality are actually reversed: Rather than principally laying open to whichever recipa-
tory mode the user chooses, the proper way to receive such a medium will actually have to be  
learned by a new user. In the MDA framework this can be expressed as follows: The user attributes  
aesthetic qualities to the dynamic run-time behavior that is generated by the medium. Different 
(inter)actions will yield different dynamics of various degrees of (aesthetic) desirability, and thus 
the user will be able to infer what the medium’s (intended) normative conventions, encoded in its  
mechanics, are.
A side-note has to be made here which is relevant for the use of electronically implemented media 
in mediating history. It has been alluded to in the previous section and will only be conclusively  
answered in the “Cybermedia” section of  5.4 Persuasive tools: The effect on the users’ attitude 
when engaging with such ‘closed constructions’ is pervasive in modern culture: Without a deep  
understanding of  how the cybermedium(‘s  agent)  works,  and with  the  normative  conventions 
communicated to them through the medium itself, they must come to an understanding that the 
best (if not the only) way to receive that medium is by simply trusting it to present whichever 
interpretable is appropriate for the given user in the given situation. In museums, open-air sites, or 
any context where electronic devices are used to convey knowledge about the physical space and 
objects in it, this can lead to an unfortunate take-over: “The devices’ screens themselves can also 
get in the way, distracting visitors from the items on display and focusing their gaze upon the 
machine instead of on the museum itself.”206 Worse yet, Sara Perry’s testing “has even suggested 
that apps falsely lead users to feel that they’ve visited ‘everything’, when in fact they’ve visited 
only a fraction of what non-users experienced.”207
To return to the question of whether hypertext and cybertext can afford mimesis2: Electronically 
implemented media do not wholly replace culture at large as the carrier of their respective opera-
205 c.f. Mark Brown’s discussion on “How Game Designers Protect Players From Themselves” (2017)
206 Perry 2015, 36
207 Perry 2016
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tional qualifying aspect, nor that all such media do control access to their scriptons in a strict  
manner. My point here is rather that even a greater level of freedom to explore an electronic 
medium’s scriptons still has to be encoded in its material modality by the author. Without their 
decision, the respective medium would not have a traversal function (hypertexts) or a cybernetic  
agent (cybertetxts) that could afford that relatively open exploration. In game studies, such cyber-
media where the recipient “chooses what, when, and how they want to approach the available 
content” are called sandbox games.208 The arguably most popular game in that genre, Minecraft, 
affords its players a great variety of creative endeavors – precisely because it gives them access to  
different natural resources that can be manipulated due to a built-in rudimentary physics engine.
These two points shall function as precursors for my attempt to answer the fundamental ques-
tions which arises from Aarseth’s ontology with regard to historical narratives:
1) Can we still speak of narrative and narration in nonlinear interpretables?
It has already been suggested at the end of section 4.1 Points of connection between historiogra-
phy, media, and textual ontology: How can nonlinear, dynamic media facilitate well-formed nar-
rative with satisfying conclusions, thus allowing its recipients to ‘extract a figure from a succes-
sion’? It has just been shown that, even for the reception of nonlinear media, this notion is too  
important to be abandoned altogether, and that such media can – at the very least – support a  
structured reception of their interpretable aspect, by effectively shifting the operational qualifying 
aspect from the realm of culture into medium’s very materiality. The question remains: Is this  
enough to facilitate well-formed narratives in nonlinear interpretables?
2) How can we claim historical veracity in nonlinear narratives?
Even if we leave aside the first question, a second problem becomes apparent immediately: The  
shift in the role of the recipient from a mere narratee, consuming a fixed interpretable, to some -
thing that is more akin to an explorer of a non-linear textual space, also entails a shift in the truth 
claim of the plots in such a space. As it is apparent to the recipient that there is more than just 
one narrative, with one carefully reared conclusion, it is also apparent that the particular narrative  
unfolding in response to their actions will lead to a conclusion which can no longer claim such 
truth. One of the perils Clyde et. al. already saw in fixed historical prose is that if it “does not  
present a cohesive narrative to the reader, the reader then creates one.” 209 As discussed, Ricoeur 
claims that ”if every narrative so explains itself, in another sense no historical narrative does so. 
Every historical narrative is looking for an explanation to incorporate into itself, because it has 
208 Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Glossary of video game terms”, (accessed 2018-01-15), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Glossary_of_video_game_terms&oldid=820209168#S
209 Clyde et. al. 2012, 8
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failed to explain itself. […] We reconstruct an agent's calculations when a course of action sur -
prises us, intrigues us, or leaves us perplexed."210 This is true for linear media. In a nonlinear inter-
pretable, however, one of two things might happen:
1. More likely in hypertext: The recipient might experience the calculations as belonging to  
some acting agent other than them (i.e. the one presented by the medium), but each indi -
vidual calculation as contingent, simply because there is more than one story-path to fol-
low, but no role-playing function to align the agent’s calculations with the user’s. In this 
case, the text's truth claim could easily be perceived as a mere matter of perspective.
2. More likely in cybertext:  If the interpretable might be experienced with a role-playing 
feedback function where the acting agent is the recipient themselves,  the calculations 
might simply be perceived as their own, rendering the historical explanation entirely omit-
table.
This is not to say that one can and should not present different, possibly conflicting, perspectives 
on a historical matter, even in the very same text, but if they are perceived as functions of an  
arbitrary number of story-paths, then the notion of a more or less veracious historical explanation 
loses its meaning.
As should become apparent now, these questions about the followability of nonlinear texts on  
the one hand and their truth claim on the other are again reflective of the dichotomous role that  
historical explanation plays in narratives. Between either being unable to resolve narrative contin-
gencies, or becoming entirely obsolete, the tension that is put upon it by nonlinear narratives has  
to be taken into account when discussing the mediation of history through interactive narratives.
5.1 Rhetorical operations in linear and nonlinear media
To answer the question of followability and conclusion in nonlinear media, I have to return to  
Aristotle’s  notion of the  ‘poet’s  control’  and attack it  from a different  perspective  than both 
Riceour and Aarseth did.
In his re-examination of ancient rhetoric with relation to hypertext, Gunnar Liestøl analyzes 
differences in the configuration of the five canons of rhetoric, namely inventio, dispositio, elocu-
tio, actio, and memoria between oral speech and hypertext.211 All are, naturally, relevant for non-
linear narratives, but for the question at hand only the first and second step, inventio and (to a 
lesser degree)  dispositio shall be considered here. Although usually translated otherwise, Liestøl 
insists that inventio “is a discovery, not an invention, in which the speaker relates to existing top-
210 Ricoeur 1984, 155
211 The original terms in Ancient Greek are (respectively) heuresis, taxis, lexis, hypocrisis, and mneme but the 
corresponding Latin terms are more commonly used.
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ics, places or loci, commonplaces, for proof and persuasion.”212
It is a preparatory activity in which the orator selects relevant elements for their speech or the  
argument they want to advance, which depends on a capacity called technê. Technê both means 
"a practical skill” and “the systematic knowledge or experience which underlies it." 213 The rhetoric 
elements one selects by means of that capacity can either be outside-technê, “found outside the 
orator”, or within-technê, depending “on the orator’s powers of reasoning and imagination.” 214 The 
two possible translations for  inventio, ‘invention’ and ‘discovery’, are thus both valid insofar as 
they emphasize either of its complementary aspects. The more common use, ‘invention’, can itself  
be regarded “a reflection of the primacy given to the writer in linear texts,”215 insofar as it empha-
sizes the within-technê, more idiosyncratic conception of a text having been thought up in the  
author’s mind, as opposed to the emphasis on the outside-technê cultural substrate from which 
the author draws inspiration.
The thus selected and/or invented elements then have to be given a syntagmatic order in dis-
positio, such as to best convey the argument or conclusion the orator wants to advance. Unsur-
prisingly, this order is strictly linear for what Aarseth called ‘proper text’.
As has been mentioned in section 3.1 Narrative as an expression of human experience of time, 
even in such linear text the reader does not merely ‘absorb’ a narrative thus laid out. As we follow  
the story, all that has already happened is evaluated to formulate “expectations concerning the 
outcome of the story, expectations that we readjust as the story moves along, until it coincides 
with the conclusions.”216 We can thus say that not only do both aspects of technê belong to the 
domain of the author, but their arrangement (dispositio) does as well. Simply put, neither can the 
reader choose what the story is about, nor how it will be told. This is what Aarseth meant by say -
ing that in linear, static media the “story determines and hides behind the plot, which produces 
the  action”  (see  4.3.2  Interactivity  in  hypertext  and  cybertext).  Nevertheless,  we  still  have  to 
actively re-discover it in the process of reception, guided by the operational qualifying aspect, and 
thus reintroduce it back into the syntagmatic order of culture (in mimesis3).
Liestøl now argues convincingly that the shift  from linear to hypertext can be described as a  
reconfiguration of inventio and dispositio, and thus engenders a shift in the relationship between 
author and reader, as well as the reception of the medium’s interpretable itself. Inventio is now an 
212 Liestøl 1994, 99
213 Halliwell 1986, 44. There is no equivalent concept in the English language, and the ancient Greek 
philosophers, most prominently Plato and Aristotle, did not precisely agree on the meaning of technê and its 
fields of application. The notion used here is Aristotle’s. Possible translations, depending on the context, are 
'craft', 'skill', 'technique', 'method', or 'art' (ibid.).
214 Liestøl 1994, 99
215 Kilfeather 1996, 43
216 Ricoeur 1991, 21f., emphasis mine
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activity shared between the author, who provides the elements of the text (outside-technê), and 
the reader, who chooses to read scriptons (entirely or partially), and follow certain links (inside-
technê).
Dispositio, on the other hand, is actually performed twice: First by the author, who combines 
the elements into textons and links them to one another, and then by the recipient, who, through 
the process of reading scriptons and following links, creates one of many possible ‘instances’ of 
the text, thus becoming a “secondary author within the constraints laid down by the primary 
author.”217
It is easy to see how this will result in a profoundly different reception of hypertexts. Speaking  
in Ricoeur’s terms, the reader is at least relieved of having to choose the ‘components capable of 
figuring’,  but all the other parts of the activity of emplotment fall  to them. As they progress 
through the text by reading scriptons and following links, they simultaneously create the very suc-
cession from which they are supposed to extract a figure.
The decisive question is whether this is perceived as merely choosing between several possible  
paths along which the hypertext story is being told, or the activity of (truly idiosyncratically) cre -
ating a new story from the provided (i.e. outside-technê) components. While even the former case 
will result in some uncertainty as to where the narration will lead, and whether one is following it 
‘correctly’, the latter case truly upends Ricoeur’s construct of emplotment because it renders the 
story’s possible conclusions pointless: The ultimate function of a story’s conclusion is to retrospec-
tively connect the (merely sequential) events in time so that ‘one after the other’ can be equated 
to ‘one because of the other’. If the position of ‘one’ after ‘the other’ is now defined at the user’s  
own discretion, that is, without reference to the outside world, then there is no causal relationship 
to be discovered, no figure to be extracted from a succession, no distention of consciousness to be 
resolved. This kind of mimetic activity will in fact be viciously circular because it is nothing but an  
exercise in introspection, starting and ending with the reader, confirming to them that the narra-
tion they produced is no more than a reflection of themselves. The rather arbitrary sequence of  
contingent events of which this narration consists can only be called a narrative if it is even per-
ceived to come to a conclusion.
As apprehended, all possible truth claims in this scenario will appear to be functions of the  
reader’s perspective. With Clyde et. al. this can be said to fall into the deconstructionist approach 
to historiography. 
If and how this just described recipatory attitude can be avoided in hypertext and the grip on a  
narrative’s  conclusion(s),  as prerequisites to historical veracity,  can be upheld,  will  have to be 
shown later. First, the notions of inventio and dispositio will also have to be applied to cybertext.
217 Liestøl 1994, 99
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5.2 Reading text, receiving media
It might not have escaped the reader’s notice that, instead of using the terms ‘medium’ and ‘recip -
ient’, as demanded in section 4.1 Points of connection between historiography, media, and textual
ontology, I resorted to using ‘text’ and ‘reader’ in the last section. This was partly due to the lop-
sidedness for written text in  Liestøl’s (just like in Aarseth’s) investigation, and partly due to him 
basing that investigation on a reinterpretation of ancient rhetoric. Rhetoric is of course about the  
artful use of language, be it spoken or written, and it seemed an unwarranted generalization to 
apply his considerations to hypermedial reception, rather than hypertextual reading. The differ-
ence between those two will be delineated presently.
What’s  more,  in section  4.3.2 Interactivity in hypertext and cybertext I  provided the video 
games as Assassin’s Creed and God of War III to exemplify strategies to minimize narrative contin-
gencies, while tacitly omitting the appropriate discussion as to where they stand with respect to 
Aarseth’s ontology of nonlinear media. How can one apply the notion of discrete textons and 
scriptons to a (mostly) seamless presentation of the informative in three-dimensional environ-
ments of video games? If such games can be called cybertexts – nonlinear, dynamic, maneuverable 
only by completely controlled access – will they not always be indeterminate? After all, no-one 
could reasonably determine the precise composition of every frame displayed on the screen, even 
if they knew exactly how the user would interact with the game. But if they are always indetermi-
nate, why do we speak of certain games as having a linear storyline, of others as having a multi -
linear one, and of others yet as having emergent storylines?
The obvious shortcoming of the terminology borrowed from Aarseth requires a deeper analysis  
of what it really means to receive the interpretable of a medium. Liestøl identifies another recon-
figuration in the process of receiving (not reading) hypertext, which I will take as a starting point  
for that analysis.
This  reconfiguration  takes  place  in  the  opposition  between  diegesis and  mimesis.218 Plato 
defines diegesis (literally: ‘narration’) as the speech act in which “the poet is speaking in his own 
person; he never leads us to suppose that he is any one else.”  Mimesis (literally: ‘imitation’) is 
employed when the “poet speaks in the person of another,” assimilating “his style to that of the 
person who, as he informs you, is going to speak.”219 As the clause ‘as he informs you’ suggests, 
Plato insists that mimesis is always a function of diegesis, because it has to be mediated (framed, 
one might say) by the poet’s narration. His scope of inquiry is strictly confined to speech (and by  
extension,  language  in  general),  of  which  there  are  only  two  modes:  Indirect  speech,  being  
diegetic, and direct speech (dialogue, monologue), being mimetic.
218 cf. Table 6: Modes of communication and cognition, roughly aligned
219 Plato 1892, 77
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Modern literary theory, especially in the Anglo-American tradition, reflects this opposition in  
the distinction between  telling and  showing “with a normative emphasis upon showing as the 
more artistic  form of expression.”220 While  there  seems to be a straight  line from  diegesis to 
telling, the congruence of mimesis and showing is not immediately obvious: Is mimesis not only 
the poet’s deplorable attempt to show their audience how the narration’s events came to pass, to 
make them believe they were actually witnessing them, rather than following his merely diegetic 
elaborations? Liestøl espouses Gerard Genette’s argument that "no narrative can 'show' or 'imitate' 
the story it tells. All it can do is tell it in a manner that is detailed, precise, 'alive,' and in that way  
give more or less the illusion of mimesis."221 From the perspective of cognitive science we can say 
that following a story does not merely comprise evaluating the propositions the narratee encoun-
ters, but constructing mental images from them.222 Thus the answer is no – showing in literature, 
although always mediated by the act of telling, need not be received as an inadequate imitation  
of actions and events within the narration.
Roughly speaking, telling should be aligned with Elleström’s mode of  propositional thinking, 
while showing should be aligned with pictorial thinking. As a rule, those two “ways of cognition 
are deeply correlated,”223 but for the purpose of this thesis that rather peculiar correlation with 
regard to written text is of greatest importance. Consider the following exemplary sentence by  
Walter Kintsch: “John traveled by car from the bridge to the house on the hill.” It can be repre-
sented in a propositional network as follows.
TRAVEL[agent: JOHN, instrument: CAR, source: BRIDGE,
       goal: HOUSE, modifier: ON[HOUSE, HILL]]
However, the mental image created from the sentence will deviate to some degree from the bare  
proposition: "John's car might be on a road, and a river might be under the bridge. [...] In some 
cases the verbal information is richer (John travels);  in other respects the image is richer (the 
inclusion of the  road and the  river).” The combination of propositional information and thereby 
created propositional translation can be illustrated224 like this:
220 Liestøl 1994, 112
221 Genette 1988, 164
222 cf. e.g. Mih & Mih, 2008 and Schneider, 2005
223 Elleström 2010a, 22
224 Kintsch 1998, 46
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The term ‘mental image’ is to be understood literally. Although it can be mapped onto a proposi-
tional network, there is “good evidence that imagery is not purely propositional, but rather relies  
on pictorial representations”225 – and not just another post-hoc proposition. But why is it that nar-
ration, in order to pass through the mode of telling to access the mode of showing, has to rely on 
our capacity to create vivid hallucinations from two-dimensional symbols? For Liestøl, it is due to 
the very nature of language as a “digital system for coding information”226 that relies on discrete 
symbolic signs. Those signs are created in a signification process which imposes a digital order on  
the analog, and is therefore necessarily reductive. In other words, language as a symbolic system 
has no direct (i.e. non-mediated) access to the analog and continuous. Hence “mimesis in words 
can only  be  mimesis  of words.”227 An,  admittedly  rough,  congruence  can thus  be  established 
between Elleström’s modes of the semiotic modality and the processing of the two literary modes  
of diegesis and mimesis:
Plato Am. literary theory Topology Scope Dominant semiotic signs
diegesis telling discrete, digital precise but narrow propositional: symbol
mimesis showing continuous, 
analog
ambiguous but comprehensive pictorial: icon, index
Table 6: Modes of communication and cognition, roughly aligned
With Elleström we can say that narration, thus conceived as mediated by the symbolic signs of  
language, is necessarily dependent on propositional thinking. However, in section 4.2 Modes and
modalities of media I have stated that mimesis2, at least in historical narratives, is dominated by 
pictorial thinking. I would still maintain this point, but has to be amended: The ‘mediatedness’ of a  
narrative by means of the symbolic signs of language functions as a sort of wrapper around the  
pictorial thinking that is activated in the process of re-discovering the heterogeneous elements we 
225 Kosslyn 1994, 20
226 Liestøl 1994, 112. The term ‘digital’ appears to be common in semiotics, especially in opposition to ‘analog’. 
In my estimation, a more expedient pair is ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’.
227 Genette 1988, 164, emphasis mine
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are conceiving (and, therefore, perceiving) as mental images.
I should add that, even though the term ‘mental images’ might suggest otherwise, those images 
and their cognition do not belong to the spatiotemporal modality; they rely on pictorial thinking, 
which is part of the semiotic modality, only that in this case there is no signification process that 
accesses the spatiotemporal modality. If this were not the case, then it could be said that the sym-
bolic signs of language (for instance in a ‘visual text’) could represent the mental images created 
from them within the spatiotemporal modality, much in the same way that a two-dimensional 
photograph can represent three-dimensional depth.
What does this entail for the reception of media, more specifically hypermedia and cybermedia, as  
opposed to linear, hyper-, or cybertext? Elleström regards pictorial thinking as more immediate 
than propositional thinking: ”The indexical and the iconic sign functions are deeply related to the  
way the mind conceives sense-data as spatiotemporal structures.” Augustine’s notion of spatial 
time,  causing  the  distention  of  consciousness,  which  is  in  turn  dialectically  resolved  through 
emplotment, might therefore be interpreted as having its roots in our a priori sensory intuitions.  
Elleström continues: “The spatiotemporal structures conceived by our mind are 'designed' to be 
meaningful – not in a propositional way, but in a pictorial way."228 One might even say that, inso-
far as pictorial thinking and the literary mode of showing can be aligned, emplotment is the act of 
creating a syntagmatic substrate from which the ‘point’ or ‘thought’ of a story can literally be 
shown to emerge.
This is of course by no means an argument for a perfect congruence of the concepts of show-
ing and pictorial thinking. An integral part of many, if not most narratives, is the account of the 
inner life of the characters it portrays, as well as "the most common type of social interaction 
between” them, “namely verbal exchanges."229 Neither can directly or accurately be represented 
through other sign systems than language. Genette’s aforementioned statement might therefore  
as well be inverted: Mimesis of words can only be mimesis in words.
However, I will  argue in the next section that, for not merely coincidental reasons, in both 
cybermedia and historiography the modes of pictorial thinking and showing overlap to a consider-
ably large extend, and that cybermedia are therefore especially well-suited for a particular type of 
historical storytelling.
Be it in historical or any other kind of storytelling, we can safely infer that the conclusion of a 
story is acceptable (and simultaneously satisfying) only if the narratee arrives at it by compulsion,  
but not by coercion or mere chance. And this is of course the root of the aforementioned norma -
228 Elleström 2010a, 22
229 Ryan 2012
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tive emphasis on  showing in the Anglo-American tradition of literary theory: the implicit insis-
tence to let the narratee extract a – nonetheless intended – figure from a succession. The artistic 
quality of this feed can then be seen in accomplishing this, even though the process is necessarily  
an indirect one.230 In fact, only the mode of showing facilitates this activity on the side of the nar-
ratee:
“In general, telling is the means of precision whereas showing is indirect and ambiguous, since 
the receiver must fill in and thereby complete the message. Showing works as a whole, an 
overall picture generated by the reader by connecting the given information. The reader's 
activity and participation in the construction of meaning increase when the system of 
communication involved moves from a mode of telling to that of showing.”231
Hypertext
With regard to the difference between reading and receiving hypertext, we can now find two  
things: At first sight, it seems to rely on two-dimensional, discrete symbols just as much as any lin-
ear, visual text. The immediate presentation – on the level of the informative – therefore depends  
on propositional thinking, notwithstanding that the interpretable thus constructed from it does 
not. What sets hypertext further into the mode of showing are the ‘jumps’, marking the reader’s 
constructive participation and exacting from them more effort to connect the given information  
in the chosen scriptons.
For linear,  visual  text,  the pictorial  reception of narration is  nested inside its  propositional 
reading process. I would assume that this particular configuration has the advantage of combining 
the precision of of telling with the verisimilitude of showing, thus being able to compel the narra-
tee to arrive at a satisfying, yet pinpointed conclusion. This is another aspect of its utility for his -
toriography.
In hypertext, this nestedness is of course still present in each scripton, while the jump between 
them is nothing less than the epitome of a loss of precision, especially when perceived in contrast  
to purely textual scriptons.232 This somewhat chimeric character might be at least one of the con-
siderable reasons why “hypertext fiction” did not manage “to achieve any popular success. In digi-
tal media, we may state that computer games are the dominant form of fiction, and today this is 
most signigicantly [sic] expressed in the advanced and innovative uses of the real time 3D environ-
ment.”233
230 How exactly this conversion between coding systems unfolds is a question that cannot be answered here. 
Cf. e.g. Holland 1989 for one attempt from the school of reader response theory.
231 Liestøl 1994, 112f., emphasis mine. The similarities to Ricoeur’s terminology could not be more 
conspicuous.
232 For the sake of the argument, I am only contrasting purely textual hypertext, and not hypermedia, with 
linear text. Forms of hypermedia that mix textual, audiovisual, and other elements do of course exist. The 
somewhat jarring effect of the jump can be assumed to be mitigated in those to some degree.
233 Liestøl 2011, 315
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Cybermedia
Video games that use these environments, such as God of War III and Assassin’s Creed, are much 
more continuous (i.e. non-discrete) on the level of their informative, which renders the terms tex-
ton and scripton hardly applicable. The semiotic modality of these (and, one might say, other non-
textual)  media  is  directly dominated by  the  iconic  and  indexical  signs  of  pictorial  thinking. 
Unbound by the first-level mediation of symbolic signs, they can be said to omit the otherwise  
necessarily ‘illusion of mimesis’ and directly show their narratives, without having to tell them.
While cybertexts like Adventure rely on discrete, symbolic signs and can be called determinate 
both on the level of their informative and interpretable aspects, modern 3D video games are in 
fact so complex that their informative aspect will, for all intents and purposes, be indeterminate,  
while the interpretable aspect – their narrative(s) – can still be determined by their authors. 234 This 
is to say that, while e.g. the player might be afforded a certain amount of leeway with regard to  
their actions, the configuration of relevant events that drive the narrative or narratives to a con-
clusion can be predefined and cybernetically propounded to the recipient. Such games can there-
fore still be called determinate on the level of their interpretable.
In  section  4.3.2  Interactivity  in  hypertext  and  cybertext I  have  stated  in  congruence  with 
Aarseth that, while in hypertext there is nothing the user ‘does in’ the script of a hypertext, in 
cybertext there is no script if the user ‘does nothing’. It is hard to conceive how inventio and dis-
positio could be applied in any meaningful way even to cybertexts like Adventure, which, due to 
their reliance on symbolic signs, are determinate in both in their informative and interpretable 
aspects. Yes, the author of a cybertext will certainly employ both outside- and inside-technê when  
choosing or creating the elements of its story, as well as dispositio, insofar as a structure has to be 
defined in which those elements show themselves. Yet, the recipient (the player) assumes an active  
role in re-creating the story through their actions in a way that exceeds the mere creation and 
continuous adjustment  of  mental  images,  which ancient  rhetorics  does  not  account  for. 235 In 
Adventure those actions are the commands typed while interacting with the cybernetic agent; in  
3D video games those are the actions executed by the avatar, invoked by the player’s control of  
keyboard, mouse, or controller.
234 This is not to say that all 3D video games feature interpretables which facilitate narratives.
235 The same point can be made with regard to elocutio, actio, and memoria. Elocutio might be equated to 
the process wherein the cybertext mechanics are defined. While actio and delivery are less prominent in 
writing (compared to the spoken word), they might be redefined for cybertexts as the parts in which the 
author skillfully defines the aesthetics of the delivery (actio), and the actual implementation so as to make the 
most efficient use of the available technical media (memoria). However, none of those take the recipient’s (or 
the cybernetic agent’s) activities into account.
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5.3 Narrative guidance, closure, and perspectivity in cybermedia
If I were to follow Aarseth, I would conclude: “Since without a user there can be no action (praxis) 
in a determinate cybertext, the concept of story (fabula) is meaningless. […] Although there is a 
narrator, because of the narratee's significant interruptions there can be no narrative, only narra-
tion.”236 This is to say that, even if followability in cybermedia is maintained, the activity that is the 
narration will not reach a conclusion and thus become a narrative. At the most, it can be hoped to 
reach (necessarily unsatisfying) closure. While it must be conceded that the nature of narration in 
determinate cybertext and its corresponding recipatory attitude is certainly different from both 
linear and hypertext, I disagree with Aarseth on this point. In order to lay out how a very particu -
lar kind of narrative, that is, a very particular kind of a) followable narration that can come to a b)  
conclusion to which one can ascribe a c) degree of versimilitude, can be fostered by cybermedia, I  
will  now finally  come back to the twice deferred argument for a certain conformity between 
cybermedial and historiographical meaning-making, and thus a particular suitedness of cyberme-
dia for the conveyance of historical understanding.
In a preliminary step I will finally have to give due to a distinction from which I refrained so  
far, the distinction between cybertext and cybermedia. I have called the reception of hypertext 
somewhat chimeric due to it mixing the precise, discrete mode of telling, based on the symbolic 
signs of the informative aspect, and the ambiguity introduced by the jumps, which requires recipi -
ents to momentarily switch into an unmediated mode of showing. (The cognitive effects and their 
up- and downsides will be touched upon in the next section.)
In contrast, even a determinate cybertext, based on symbolic signs, will most likely leave the 
recipient in a mode of active participation in the construction of meaning, both because of them 
being addressed with the pronoun ‘you’, and because of the constant back and forth between 
recipient and cybernetic agent. It is precisely the action ‘in’ the cybertext that sets their reception  
further into the mode of  showing. While especially cybertext role-playing games were modestly 
successful  until  the mid-1990s,  3D-based adventure games have since reached a much larger 
audience. Yes, the growing popularity of digital games at large, along with ever-increasing pro-
cessing power of PCs and consoles, brought all kinds of 3D-based video games in which the player  
assumes strategic responsibility for a character (e.g. first-person shooters, racing games, simula-
tions of various kinds) into the mainstream. And yes, many of those games do not (predominantly) 
rely on storytelling, but rather highlight the game’s mechanics and the player’s dexterity and skill  
in interacting with them.237 However, my argument is that cybermedia, insofar its semiotic modal-
236 Aarseth 1994, 774
237 c.f. the aforementioned distinction between games of emergence and games of progression (Juul 2002 & 
2005).
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ity relies predominantly on pictorial thinking, lends itself more naturally to storytelling dominated  
by the mode of  showing:  The different iconic and indexical signs received from the respective 
medium will have to be set into relation by the recipient in a way that resolves their inherent  
ambiguity with an inescapably contingent, yet acceptable conclusion.
A very similar model has been used by Ricoeur to describe how a historian, following the con-
structivist approach, would form a narrative from the heterogeneous elements of the past. One 
might say that, in this sense, a historical narrative is also expected to show how its elements had 
to lead to the conclusion put forth in it, even though it will require ancillary explanations. The  
most obvious problem when trying to apply a hypermedial reception process to historiography is  
that a layman recipient of a historico-hypermedial narrative, in contrast to a historian, will not 
have all the analytical tools at their disposal to ensure any strong degree of  verifiability.  They 
might thus be compelled to conclude whatever appears to ‘emerge’ from that unfolding narrative.
5.3.1 Guidance
I would argue that at least this volatility of interpretation can be contained by proper interpreta-
tive guidance by the cybernetic agent, even within pictorially dominated media. In fact, creators  
of all kinds of audiovisual media have a large set of tools at their disposal to convey rather pre -
cisely to their audience how the (otherwise ambiguous) signs are supposed to be understood. Con-
sider Mike Rugnetta’s account of the television show The People v. O. J. Simpson: American Crime  
Story:238
I can't help but notice that the camera works tirelessly, telling the audience how to feel about 
Robert Kardashian or O. J. It tells us which interactions are highly charged or overly tense. 
Lacking a text narrator the show adds one back in with cinematography to subtly 'fill in the 
gaps'.239
The particular narrative ‘perspective’, thus conveyed to the recipients, is all the more important 
since The People v. O. J. Simpson: American Crime Story is of course a retelling of the real events 
around the O. J. Simpson murder case, and not just a fictional story. While accusations of bias 
toward a certain interpretation of these events could simply be deflected with reference to artistic  
freedom, the same can not be claimed for television news. Yet, the use of similar narrative tech-
niques in this field is not only possible but increasingly prevalent: In comparing the coverage of  
the Watergate crisis around Richard Nixon in 1973-74 and the impeachment of Bill Clinton in 
1998, Geoffrey Baym found that the use of both images (still and moving) and audio (as sound 
bites) shifted from a presentation where they would “appear as unmediated, directly apparent” to 
238 Murphy et. al., 2016
239 Rugnetta 2016
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one where they “are overtly mediated, constructed for audience appreciation.”240 To illustrate this, 
he
“gives the example of one shot of Clinton beginning with a close-up of a portrait of George 
Washington, the US president credited with having said, ‘I cannot tell a lie.’ The camera then 
zooms out to reveal President Clinton, whose ‘problem with the truth’ was by then a central 
topic in the news [...]. The meaning is obvious but is also clearly constructed; this is not ‘just 
the facts’, the claim of traditional journalism.”241
To conclude:
1. Cybermedia, as opposed to cybertext, lends itself more naturally to narration dominated 
by the mode of showing.
2. Receiving narration thus dominated by pictorial thinking can arguably be aligned with the 
activity of historiographical emplotment, in that it ‘grasps together’ heterogeneous and 
ambiguous elements into a comprehensive overview.
3. There is no reason to principally assume a missing degree of ‘guidedness’ in narration that 
is not dominated by symbolic signs. Different media afford different tools to guide their  
recipients to desired conclusions.242
3.5.2 Closure and perspectivity
Two points remain to be answered: Whether, and how, can cybermedia facilitate the narrative clo-
sure denied by Aarseth? Whether, and how, can a sense of ‘critical inquiry’ be mediated to the lay-
man recipient of that narrative?
As to the first, one might simply speak from experience and point to the manifold examples of 
video games that evidently do tell linear, nonlinear, or entirely emergent stories. Audiences might 
have divergent preferences for either of these kinds of games, and debate whether certain game 
mechanics match the respective ‘style’ of storytelling, but there is no doubt that narrative closure  
can be achieved even in video games with widely ramified and, at first glance, entirely contingent  
narratives. At least the first two games in the Assassin’s Creed series and all installments of the  
God of War series are instances of such cybermedia, classifiable in this way as having linear stories,  
i.e.  having linear interpretable aspects.  However,  this intuitive understanding of a cybermedial  
capacity for storytelling says nothing about the underlying interpretative mechanics, and does 
therefore not allow for any inferences for their suitedness for historical storytelling either. What  
ever those interpretative mechanics are, it should be obvious that historical storytelling in cyber -
240 Baym 2004, 286
241 Huisman et. al. 2006, 151
242 Geoffrey Baym explicitly makes the distinction between ‘mimetic’ and ‘diegetic’ with regard to images in 
television news. This is by no means a contradiction to what has been said hitherto, because those are 
categories of communication in general. Outside of Plato’s strict conception of mimesis and diegesis, the 
methods to employ those in different media will have to answer to their respective peculiarities.
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media must remain determinate in its interpretable aspect if any truth claim is to be made. This  
does not necessarily mean that its story must also be linear. However, cybermedia (and cybertext,  
for that matter) with indeterminate interpretable aspects, either stemming from dynamic plots 
created by the cybernetic agent, or from emergent social behavior like in TinyMUD, should be out-
side of this thesis’ focus.243
My answer to the second question, that for the capacity of cybermedial storytelling to facilitate  
perspectivity and thus critical inquiry, builds on Ricoeur’s and Bruner’s elaborations of the nature  
of narratives and its ties to a human understanding of the world we live in. Most of those have 
already been laid out in this thesis, but it is Ricoeur himself who draws conclusions from his earlier 
work in an essay called Life in Quest of Narrative, which seem to be most eligible to support my 
argument. It is this:
Humans organize not just events of the past, but their very own experiences and the contin-
gencies of life into narratives, and thus render them both intelligible and psychologically bearable.  
Cybermedial, that is, interactive storytelling, does resemble those experiences more closely than 
other modes of storytelling, and can thus be called more life-like. It is therefore that the same 
mechanisms that we use when organizing experience, for better or worse, will apply when receiv-
ing those narratives.
To show how Ricoeur’s Life in Quest of Narrative can be aligned with interactive storytelling in 
cybermedia, I will have to reiterate a number of points taken from him and Bruner in chapter 3
Making sense of the past about the relation between narrative and human experience of time:
Ricoeur’s notion of emplotment is not reserved to historical events. It mediates between the 
heterogeneous events that are imposed upon us, and there is no reason to doubt that an under-
standing of cybermedia does not employ that very same activity. Even in symbol-based narratives  
of written text, those elements are re-created in the recipient’s mind (cf. Kintsch).
A narrative cannot be without a narrator, and thus not without a perspective. ‘Perspectivity’ 
was named as the last of Bruner’s four grammatical constituents of narrative, employed by Emily 
to mark contingent conclusions as stemming from her own ‘epistemic perspective’. Those conclu-
sions have to belong to a narrator; they cannot arise incidentally from the mere succession of 
events. In order to facilitate narration, perspectivity has to be established in cybermedia as well,  
hence the role-playing user functionality being so dominant. By extension, it is warranted to con-
clude with Ricoeur that the faculty to incorporate ‘critical discontinuity’ into ‘narrative continuity’ 
243 There are, of course, other kinds of cybermedia that might not be called video games, and those that 
might be video games, but without any narrative capacities. Potential for historical education can even be 
found in the latter – real-time strategy games in a historical setting come to mind, conveying understanding 
of societal development, strategies for allocating resources, and warfare.
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is also given in cybermedia.
Just like with any other narrative, the capacity of cybermedial narrative to be followed springs 
from it presenting a “world in which it would be possible to live.” 244 Recipients will employ Ryan’s 
‘principle of minimal departure’ and assume similarity with their own reality, unless overruled by 
the medium. However, the recipient might have greater freedom of interpreting that world in pic-
torially dominated and/or nonlinear narratives. Depending on the level of guidedness they might  
be restricted to a perfectly linear narrative (like in God of War III), or they might be given com-
plete interpretative freedom, even to the extend that mimesis2 could fall entirely to them. In either 
case, the ‘components capable of figuring’ are still strictly controlled by the cybermedium.
Nevertheless, the perspectival mode we assume to extract meaningful conclusions from contin-
gent events is fundamentally our own, both for the life in which we live, and the fictional worlds 
in which our player-character lives.245 It can be set in opposition to ‘proper texts’, in which “it is 
the author who is disguised as the narrator and who wears the mask of the various characters and,  
among all of these, the mask of the dominant narrative voice that tells the story we read.” There is 
no such author in cybertext or in (real) life, yet it is not us who can (autonomously) choose the  
‘components capable of figuring’ a narrative. “It is in this way that we learn to become the narra-
tor and the hero of our own story, without actually becoming the author of our own life.”246 The 
same applies to cybermedia with role-playing user functionality.
Finally, this point by Ricoeur can be used to refute Aarseth’s assertion that there can be no nar-
rative closure in determinate cybertexts: We can, in fact, extract a ‘figure from a succession’ even 
though we are a) necessarily involved as actors in that succession’s creation without b) having  
complete control over it. Yes, the concept of fabula becomes meaningless as long one defines it 
rigidly as  the narrative’s  predefined elements,  chosen by the author (and no-one else)  at the 
244 Ricoeur 1991, 26
245 One a side-note, the limits of what constitutes that ‘world in which it would be possible to live’ can 
arguably be stretched quite far. A number of examples that allow for a very generous interpretation of the 
role-playing user functionality shall be named here, although I will not otherwise look into their utility for the 
effort of this thesis.
Worlds like in the video games Portal or Braid are utterly unlike our own in terms of how their game world is 
constituted, and therefore also in terms of the actions they require in that world. In Portal, space  works 
differently, because the first-person player-character creates the eponymous wormhole-like portals to solve 
puzzles, thus generating all kinds of physical manipulations that are not possible in the real world. Braid, in 
contrast, is a side-scrolling 2D game in which the third-person player-character can manipulate time while 
certain objects and the player-character himself are sometimes immune to this manipulation. Both games 
present worlds that are different from ours in a very fundamental sense, and yet they afford an interpretative 
scope that relies on the perspectivity of a player-character.
An even more peculiar example are real time strategy games like The Settlers or Age of Empires, where the user 
inhabits the role of an unembodied, omniscient agent leading the exploration and/or development of a tribe or 
civilization. In those games the perspectivity of a story that could be told about the game’s events cannot 
belong to any one being made of flesh and blood. Tasked with naming that agent holding the perspectivity and 
enumerating some of its properties, one would have to resort to such cloudy concepts as the 'spirit' or the 
'collective identity' of that tribe or civilization.
246 Ibid, 32
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moment of inventio. If one wanted to reconstruct a notion of fabula that Ricoeur could espouse, 
it would be more akin to that of a post-hoc selection of elements, which might be re-arranged 
and re-interpreted as we move through our life, or through the cybermedial narration. The con-
clusions we draw from this configuration will then necessarily be encumbered with a degree of  
preliminarity and uncertainty – which is exactly the moment at which perspectivity, and thus crit -
ical discontinuity, must be employed.
I would argue that in this way, cybermedia can facilitate a mediation and interpretation of the  
past that is both verisimilar and veracious. The verisimilitude stems from all  the properties of  
cybermedia that make us employ the very modes of interpretation which we also employ in real 
life. Those have just been enumerated. The veracity stems from the capacity of the cybernetic  
agent, and by extension the medium’s author, to a) provide the recipient with the expedient nar-
rative elements and events, and b) to guide them so as to arrive at historiographically favorable  
conclusions – which will still perceived as their very own.
This model has a conspicuously open flank, one that e.g. Clyde et. al. would be quick to make  
out: Verifiability, which in conjunction with veracity is the hallmark of their  truth claim of any 
historical narrative, does not occupy any integral function here. As apprehended earlier in 5 Non-
linear narration and historical narratives, because the user would employ their own perspectivity, 
facilitated by the role-playing feedback function, they could in fact also view the conclusions’  
verifiability as entirely omittable. This would veer an interpretation of the past resting (only) on 
the recipient’s “own experience of the evidence or arguments”247 slightly further into the direction 
of deconstructionism.
Those are hazards that cannot be negated. However, I would argue that they are fundamentally 
inherent in narration as the form for historical understanding. Yes, a layman recipient will unlikely  
form any ‘evidence relationships’ in a scholarly, that is, somewhat verifiable way; that is to say by 
means  of  Ricoeur’s  causal  analysis and  rational  explanation.  If,  alternatively,  one  wanted to 
present to the recipient a veracious and in this vein verifiable account of the past, it would require 
a linear narrative ‘in which’ they were not involved by mode of action. This way we would have to 
forego the utility of the recipient’s own perspectival stance, evoked by the role-playing user func-
tionality. A choice has to be made between risking a – to some degree – skewed interpretation of 
the past that is nevertheless marked as such by the recipient’s own stance, and retaining an inter-
pretation that is canonical, but likely unscrutinized. I see two reasons for the former option to be 
preferred in the context of cybermedia:
The first one is a question of principle – an understanding of the past always requires interpre-
tation. It does not ‘reveal’ itself once all the heterogeneous elements are laid out in the appropri-
247 Clyde et. al. 2012, 7
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ate way, because there is no one such way. There are only more or less valid, that is, more or less  
defensible interpretations. As has been said, a ‘testable’  truth claim like in the nomological sci-
ences is not attainable by historiography (c.f. 3.3 The epistemology of narratives). This stance does 
not fall into the approach of deconstructionism, as Ricoeur has argued convincingly: ”Contingency 
is unacceptable only to a mind that attaches the idea of mastery to that of understanding.” 248 
Appreciating this ‘interpretedness’ is paramount for a willingness to engage in open inquiry to  
determine the level of verifiability of the respective interpretation. Contrary to the stance put 
forth by Clyde et. al., I propose that his approach must not be reserved in principle to scholars; it is 
in fact just as important to foster the same appreciation in any layman recipient of historical nar-
rative, so as to prevent interpretations that either rest too rigidly on the scholars’ authority, or fall  
into the arbitrariness of a deconstructionist and postmodern view of the past.
The second reason rests on a pragmatic consideration: Some degree of interpretative freedom 
has to be granted to recipients to allow for their perspectival stance. Cybermedia, or more specifi-
cally the cybermedial agent who can guide the reception among the desired normative conven-
tions, should be able to facilitate that freedom without compromising a constructionist approach  
to historical understanding. The cognitive and semiotic qualities of medial reception that can be 
employed to this end have been laid out earlier in this section. This is still a very vague statement,  
but it loses its radical semblance when one looks at practical examples:
In museums and especially in open air sites, symbols are already employed which rely on picto-
rial thinking, even if their interpretation is guided by the more rigid digital system of language.  
However, whenever one relies on the former, one has to take a certain level of interpretative free-
dom into account. Ephesus and Troy, by their mere presence, will feature this mode of thinking (to 
one degree or another) already, whether there is interpretative guidance present or not. The Ger-
man Emigration Center deliberately aims to invoke the visitor’s own palpable experiences by using  
iconic and indexical signs, like a tilted, cranking wooden floor ‘under deck’ during the passage, the 
subtle sound of a heartbeat in the corridor outside of the emigrant inspection station that is mod-
eled after the one on Ellis Island, or the museum’s very admission ticket which doubles as an emi -
grant’s ticket to the New World. Those experiences can then be used as a “measuring tape” 249 to 
gauge the significance of the respective situation for the respective emigrant. This comparability, 
however, “requires non-identity”250 with the emigrant, which in conjunction with the symbolic 
signs provided in the museum does arguably facilitate a constructionist approach to history in the  
visitor.
248 Ibid., 150




Apart from these practical examples, in the next section I will attempt to delineate a very lim-
ited number of persuasive tools that can be more directly derived from the properties of hypertext 
and cybermedia, which could be used to facilitate the interpretative guidedness.
5.4 Persuasive tools
The persuasive tools available to any author must necessarily differ for every medium and could be 
laid out separately for each individual medial implementation in principle. This section will only 
delineate those tools that come to the fore in hypertext and cybermedia, as it can be said that the  
burden of feasibility lies more obviously on those rather than traditional (read: linear) media, and  
because it seems obvious that with new media configurations there will also be new such tools 
that have to be explored.
5.4.1 Hypertext
Since not only the interpretable’s re-discovery, but also the informative’s re-creation in hypertext 
is ultimately the domain of the reader (with Liestøl: the secondary author), there might be no 
methodology to guarantee a reception along the lines of Ricoeur’s emplotment, which would in  
turn ensure the constructionist approach to historical narrative. However, in an attempt to redeem 
hypertext for the effort of this thesis, at least three properties can be exploited:
1) Affordances of local and global coherence
Since the aforementioned self-referential or idiosyncratic mimetic activity is brought about by the  
reader’s inside-technê aspect of inventio, it should not be given too much leeway. Speaking with 
Elleström,  the  ‘stringent’  reception necessary  for  a  historical  narrative  in  hypertext  should  be 
encoded in the operational qualifying aspect. The two most obvious measures to accomplish this 
might be: Composing scriptons that are locally coherent, but can also be linked (syntagmatically)  
to a number of other scriptons;  and only placing links at the very end of scriptons,  so as to 
encourage the reader to first complete the current scripton before wandering off to the next. 
Additionally, there might even be a way to encode a requirement in the hypertext’s traversal func-
tion to first finish reading one scripton before being able to proceed to the next.
2) Expectations of coherence
There is good reason to believe that readers will, by and large, expect to find narrative coherence  
in the interpretable. Ralf Schneider characterizes the reading of prose in general as a cognitive  
process “in which operations of inferencing provide grammatical and logical connections between 
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phrases or sentences and resolve anaphoric references, so that local and global coherence between 
the passages just read can be established.” The thus formed “knowledge structures” are then used 
“so that implicit hypotheses as to incoming information are established.”251 This is congruent with 
Ricoeur’s delineation of the reading process.
In  his  examination  of  the  particularities  of  the  hypertext reading  activity,  Schneider  then 
describes how participants of a study by Dobson and Miall reported a sense of disorientation and 
“fear of losing track” that coincided with slower reading speed. He attributes those to the higher 
cognitive load of “keeping tentative versions of a situation model active over a longer time, until 
incoming information will support one variety.”252 Both suggest that the “mind’s powerful need for 
coherence,” a commonplace notion in cognitive sciences, is also prevalent in hypertext reading.253
This finding also suggests that the risk of the recipient employing a – to some degree – idiosyn -
cratic mimetic activity is somewhat mitigated by the need for coherence. In opposition to cyber-
media, where this is a function of the recipients perspectivity and thus footnoted as such, the sort 
of coherence that Schneider points to is still expected to be maintained by the hypertext’s author.
3) The utility of disorientation
One cannot but notice the congruence between the pattern of cognitive processes, triggered in 
the face of apprehended incoherence, and the constructionist approach to historiography as laid 
out by Clyde et. al. Schneider describes how the just mentioned knowledge structures “are kept 
active as long as possible, following a principle of parsimonious use of processing capacities.” This  
is likely done in a more conscious manner in hypertext (compared to linear text) since “choosing 
links may in fact merely activate additional self-monitoring thought processes.”254 Seeking textual 
coherence in this context is akin to “analysing how and what individual pieces of evidence can do,  
and what conclusions [...] can be established through evidence relationships.”255
The parsimonious use of processing capacities might also be aligned to the process Ricoeur  
called causal analysis: Only the knowledge structures that appear to be ‘really necessary’ and best 
suited to explain the unfolding of the narrative will be kept active (cf.  3.3 The epistemology of
narratives). The aforementioned oscillation between the precision and directedness, present in the 
251 Schneider 2005, 200
252 Ibid., 201
253 Ibid.; cf. also Dobson & Miall, 1998. Two caveats have to be made: First, the study partly attributes the 
slower reading speed to the hypertext’s presentation on a computer screen. Considering that the study was 
conducted in 1998, one can assume that this negative influence of the means of technical presentation will be 
reduced due to more modern devices. Second, part of the disorientation was due to the comparatively short 
scriptons and the framing of each as a closed off unit from the next. This is obviously no fixed property of 
hypertext. As argued in item one of this list, it should instead be regarded as a conscious design choice.
254 Schneider 2005, 200. This is not to be equated to aforementioned recipient’s perspectival stance in 
cybertext, which relies on the their active participation ‘in’ the text.
255 Clyde et. al. 2012, 7
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act of  telling each scripton, and the ambiguity and incompleteness imposed upon the recipient  
with each jump, will draw attention to their active participation in the construction of meaning.
It is at this moment where the hypertext author has to forestall potential assumptions by the 
reader, necessarily drawn from their respective cultural background by the principle of minimal  
departure. To reiterate the wager from rational explanation, Ricoeur’s second mode of explana-
tion: "If y is a good reason for A to do x, then y would be a good reason for anyone sufficiently 
like A to do x under sufficiently similar circumstances."256 A non-scholarly audience cannot always 
know what this sufficiently similar context for the rational explanation might be, so it must be 
provided by the author.
To summarize, disorientation in hypertext can and should be used, however carefully, to make 
the reader more akin to a ‘secondary historian’ in the constraints encoded by the author. How this  
should make for a more engaging learning experience and foster better knowledge retention has 
been shown in sections 3.4 Narrative vs. nomological understanding and knowledge retention and 
4.3.1 The technical configuration of dynamic media and its effects.
5.4.2 Cybermedia
As stated in section  5.3 Narrative guidance, closure, and perspectivity in cybermedia, the main 
challenge that persuasive tools in cybermedial historical narration have to address is to allow for a 
recipient to arrive at their own perspectival yet nevertheless veracious stance in a compelling way.
One way to achieve this is a careful mediation (executed by the cybernetic agent) between the  
two poles of Bruner’s  “canonicality  and exceptionality.”257 Since our folk-psychological  under-
standing seeks canonicality, we can use deviations from it to challenge and let the recipients ‘dis-
cover’ historical explanations. According to Bruner, this is (quite conveniently) the very moment  
which makes those experiences satisfying, because they “achieve their meanings by explicating 
deviations from the ordinary in a comprehensible form.”258 Exceptionality, the unknown, is there-
fore a prerequisite of any good narrative, as long as it can eventually be explicated and thus be 
returned to the realm of (known) culture.259
This “capacity of literary fiction to unsettle readers’ expectations and challenge their think-
ing”260 has also been attributed to Roland Barthes’ writerly text. It is opposed to the readerly text, 
256 Dray 1957, 132
257 Bruner 1990, 47
258 Ibid.
259 To reiterate: By doing so, the explication will necessarily be incorporated into the realm of culture and 
therefore change it to a minute degree.
260 Kidd & Castrano 2013, 377. ‘Literary literature’ is used here in opposition to ‘genre literature’, which is 
commonly referred to as the kind of literature that does not challenge its readers. Even though this definition 
seems murky and somewhat elitist (like the notion of the writerly text itself), Kidd & Castrano succeeded in 
establishing a clear dichotomy between those types in terms of their psychological impact on readers (2016).
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in which the recipient “is left with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the  
text:  reading  is  nothing  more  than a  referendum.”261 I  have  argued  in  an  analogous  manner 
against interactive historical narratives that do not challenge their recipients and do not allow 
them to form their  own stance.  In short,  I  would say that historical  narratives in cybermedia 
should never be entirely readerly. However, they cannot be entirely writerly either since this sort 
of text is very much the (possibly Utopian) ideal of a
perpetual present, upon which no consequent language (which would inevitably make it past) 
can be superimposed; the writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the 
world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular 
system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of 
networks, the infinity of languages.262
Leaving aside the question of whether a truly and wholly  writerly text can be composed (more 
precisely: some medium that facilitates a fully  writerly reception) at all, it can be said that for 
media with historical narratives all the constraints of historiography still apply and will necessarily 
make them fall short of this ideal.
The notion of the writerly text bears utility here because attached to it is the effect of defamil-
iarization. Originally introduced by the Russian formalists as a distinguishing quality of literary 
texts,263 it has since been shown that this effect is in fact evoked by texts with a degree of writer-
liness. There seems to be more than one quality of media (not only texts) that can defamiliarize 
the recipient. Kidd & Castrano cite the cognitive literary theorist David Herman, who proposes  
that the “processing of narratives is more complex when they inhibit what might be termed the  
naïve application of [psychological] scripts and promote instead reflection on the limits of appli -
cability of the scripts being invoked.”264 A rather vague statement, but one that is consistent with 
Bruner’s distinction between canonicality and exceptionality, and one that furthermore should 
serve to facilitate Ricoeur’s ‘critical discontinuity’.
At least a few more specific tools used to defamiliarize the recipient can be pointed to: One is  
“the systematic use of phonological, grammatical, and semantic stylistic devices."265 This has, how-
ever, only been been shown in the context of ‘visual literature’ (c.f. Elleström) and therefore per-
tains to the symbolic signs of language. It is not immediately obvious if and how it could be 
applied to pictorial semiotic signs, but language can of course be part of any cybermedium as well.  
This quality might therefore already be given when the medium presents, for instance, a historical  
character (real or fictional) that speaks (audibly or presented via visual text) to the player-charac-
ter in an anachronistic dialect. The German Emigration center uses a number of audio exhibits 
261 Barthes 1970, 4
262 Ibid., 5
263 Huisman et. al. 2006, 31
264 Herman 1997, 1054
265 Miall & Kuiken 1994, 15ff.
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where  visitors  can  listen  to  excerpts  from  emigrants’  diaries  which  are  narrated  in  strong,  
anachronistic dialects.
Another quality that can defamiliarize the recipient is the presentation of so-called ‘round’  
(rather  than  ‘flat’)  characters,  which  “cannot  be  readily  understood  in  terms  of  a  particular 
schema, and thus readers must consistently attend to cues to their mental states.”266 Kidd & Cas-
trano show in a series of experiments in two studies how reading literary fiction, which typically  
features such round characters, fosters affective and cognitive Theory of Mind. The former is the 
“ability to detect and understand other’s emotions,” while the latter is “the inference and repre-
sentation of others’ beliefs and intentions.”267 They do therefore “propose that by prompting read-
ers to take an active writerly role to form representations of characters’ subjective states, literary  
fiction recruits” Theory of Mind.268 They also point to a number other studies that show the same 
effects in “nonviolent video games” and “acclaimed TV dramas,” and possibly also other nonfic-
tional media.269 Not just visual literature, but media with a degree of writerliness in general, there-
fore seems very well equipped to, in effect, evoke Ricoeur’s mode of ‘rational explanation’.
For  historical  narratives  the  ‘roundness’  of  characters,  that  is,  their  “implied  (rather  than 
explicit) sociocognitive complexity,”270 could simply be invoked by presenting ‘historically accurate’ 
decisions  that  a  person  might  have  made.  Moreover,  in  cybermedial  historical  narration  the 
player-character should only be given space for such ‘historically accurate’ decisions – especially if  
they seem (only initially, one must hope) implausible to the modern recipient. For Troy and Eph-
esus, one obvious source for such seemingly implausible decisions could lie in superstitious behav-
ior from that period, which could be woven into an otherwise mundane narrative thread.271
When it comes to defamiliarizing the recipient by using pictorial rather than symbolic signs (of 
language), I want to propose an approach that should in fact hold the solution to two challenges  
at once.
First, David Herman has just been quoted in attributing to defamiliarization the capacity to 
‘inhibit what might be termed the naïve application of scripts and promote instead reflection on 
the limits of applicability of the scripts being invoked’. The kinds of ‘scripts’ which need to be  
inhibited in their application are e.g. scripts for the interpretation of visual and auditory elements  
of the medium. How can this be achieved? Second, a problem with the recipient’s uncritical stance 
toward the ‘closed construction’ that is a cybermedium had been identified early in 5 Nonlinear
narration and historical narratives and then deferred to this very section. In open-air sites (like 
266 Kidd & Castrano 2016, 475
267 Kidd & Castrano 2013, 377
268 Ibid., 379. The results where then reproduced in greater detail in Kidd & Castrano 2016.
269 Kidd & Castrano 2016, 484
270 Ibid., 483
271 See Riess 1895, and Violatti 2016 for examples of superstitions in ancient Greece.
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Troy and Ephesus), it can cause mobile applications “to take precedence in the visitor experience, 
but users may actually come to cultural heritage sites with expectations that this is meant to hap-
pen.”272 This would be tantamount to the interpretation (a history) masking the interpreted (the 
past) and thus diminish the space for critical inquiry. The answer to both challenges lies, in the 
context of open-air sites, in using augmented reality to set the (digital part of the) cybermedium 
into a dialogue with the physical site. That is to say, the historical interpretation presented pictori -
ally through a digital device should always rely, to one degree or another, on the physical ‘back-
drop’ of the actual site, and never replace or overwrite it. It can, however, present (seemingly)  
conflicting information and thus highlight the difference between the past and its interpretation.  
To give one simple example: The vast meadow that spreads out at the foot of the mount on which 
Troy was built used to be a natural harbor which is now silted up. An augmented media applica -
tion could overlay this meadow with ships, even though they could obviously not exist there in the 
present day anymore.
Finally, one side-note shall be made to distinguish between defamiliarization and disorientation,  
which I purposefully located in different sections of this chapter. Some literary critics have drawn 
a connection between hypertext and the writerly text.273 One must not look very far to find rea-
sons why:
In this ideal [of the writerly] text, the networks are many and interact, without anyone of 
them being able to surpass the rest; this text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of 
signifieds; it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several entrances, none 
of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one.274
This could be easily read as a description of the  structure of hypertext. However, I am at least 
skeptical about hypertext’s capacity to be inherently cut out for writerly texts, whereas I see that 
potential  in  cybermedia:  In  the  latter,  the  role-playing  user  functionality  will  mark  the  just 
described contingencies as belonging to (the experience of) a continuous subject which is the  
player-character. Hypertext lacks the this feature and will likely only disorient the recipient and 
lead them to assume that they did not chose a fitting sequence of scriptons in the face of an  
unsettling, that is, potentially defamiliarizing experience.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
The effort of this thesis has been to define the semiotic qualities of any given medium to effec-
272 Akrivi et. al. 2016
273 c.f. Kilfeather 1996, 43
274 Barthes 1970, 5
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tively convey or facilitate a veracious interpretation of the past. A tension between that sought  
veracity and  verisimilitude as well as  verifiability has been identified. A number of causes have 
been identified in which this triad of qualities can be grounded. To understand the entanglement  
of the three qualities and the intricate ways in which they interact, each cause had to be exam-
ined closely:
The subject of historiography, namely the past, due to which knowledge can only be created in  
the mode of retrodiction; folk psychology, which, in order to orient a human agent in the spa-
tiotemporal condition with situated events, is strongly biased towards the capacity of narration to 
incorporate deviations from canonicality; the importance of and potential space for nomological 
thinking within narration and vice versa;  the structuring of medial  reception through various 
interconnected modes and modalities; the desired properties of media that allow for a histori-
graphically  sound  presentation  and  interpretation  of  the  past,  especially  with  regard  to  the 
involvement of the recipient.
By  taking  those  underlying  causes  into  consideration,  I  have  attempted  to  parsimoniously  
sketch a theory from which one can derive a heuristic of tools for mediating history effectively 
(that is, by means of interactive storytelling). The first necessary step towards that theory was to  
concede that the tension between veracity, verisimilitude, and verifiability cannot be resolved, at 
least with said goal of this thesis in mind. These criteria each play an important role, so a medial  
framework had to be defined carefully, one that could accommodate each criterion in its own 
right. Different types of media were analyzed and cybermedia was identified as the type with the  
capacity to meet all criteria.
Other underlying causes could have been considered, but were omitted for the sake of brevity. The 
first few that come to mind are: reader response criticism from the field of psychoanalytic psy-
chology;275 the concept of “flow” from positive psychology;276 the role of human playing in culture 
and personal development from ludology;277 the conception from Russian folklore studies of nar-
ratives as syntagmatic structures in which the narrative elements each serve an identifiable func-
tion;278 the underpinnings of playful and artistic expression from psychoanalytical theory.279
Those and (potentially numerous) others would serve to create a fuller picture of what is in fact 
at play when receiving the manifold forms of medial narratives, which in turn has to be be taken 
into account when creating aforementioned heuristic. They would allow for both a broader theo -
retical base and for deeper insight into elements of the theory that have already been laid out 
275 c.f. e.g. Holland 1989
276 c.f. Csikszentmihalyi 1997
277 c.f. Huizinga 1955 and Caillois 1961
278 c.f. e.g. Propp 2010
279 c.f. Winnicott 1980
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here.
So far, the persuasive tools presented above are only few and far between all the other possible 
and/or necessary rules and tricks that authors/creators have to know to create good historical 
interactive narratives.  I  only presented some that can be derived directly from my theoretical 
argumentation. With a broader base, more such tools might directly be derived from theory. For  
instance, the concept of ‘defensive patterns’ from Hollands’ reader response criticism might point 
to valuable insight into where Ricoeur’s rational explanation might meet its (scholarly defensible) 
limits.  The notion of Winnicott’s ‘transitional object’ might provide some insight into  how the 
role-playing user function in cybermedia actually functions psychologically.
The last two paragraphs do again exemplify the multitude of fields and viewpoints from which 
one can begin to sketch a theory. Having said that, I regard those that I did actually choose to  
focus on in this thesis as the most fundamental ones. That is to say, I am reasonably confident that 
incorporating more underlying causes to both broaden and deepen my theory will not require fun-
damental changes to or impugn what has already been said. I can, naturally, not be certain about 
this before it is done; amendments will have to be made and are expected.
Additionally, not all of those tools will be educed by a top-down approach from theory to prac -
tice. As exemplified by the interspersed perspectives on Troy, Ephesus, and the German Emigration 
Center, the reverse approach should be just as fruitful, as will a comparative analysis with already  
existing implementations of and for interactive historical narratives.
For the former, I favor a concept called critical making, put forth by Matt Ratto in 2008, which 
attempts to bridge the gap between theory and practice. It “is an elision of two typically discon-
nected mode [sic] of engagement in the world – ‘critical thinking’, often considered as abstract,  
explicit, linguistically-based, internal and cognitively individualistic; and ‘making’, typically under-
stood as material, tacit, embodied, external and community-oriented.”280
The latter, already existing implementations, can be split up further into two categories: Tech-
nological systems that facilitate interactive historical narratives, and practical implementations, 
partly within those systems. Noteworthy technological systems are: The ontology CURATE and its 
implementation,  Storyspace;281 the  CHESS project (Cultural Heritage Experiences through Socio-
personal  interactions  and  Storytelling);282 SitSim (Situated  Simulations);283 meSch (Material 
Encounters with Digital Cultural Heritage).284 All of those are are also exemplified through imple-
280 Ratto & Hockema 2009, 52
281 Wolff et.al. 2012 and Collins et. al. 2012
282 Vayanou 2014 and Perry 2015
283 Liestøl 2011, 2013, 2014, Liestøl et. al. 2011, Liestøl & Friedlander, 2013, Liestøl & Morrison 2015, and 
Smørdal et. al 2016
284 Petrell et. al. 2014
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mentations in one or more of the cited articles. Other practical examples are: The Streetmuseum 
and Streetmuseum Londinium smartphone applications;285 the app Voices Recognition, “designed 
to augment one’s interaction with York Cemetery, its spaces and visible features”;286 the app iVisit  
Anatolia that  uses  augmented  reality  to  display  four  digitally  reconstructed  buildings  in  
Bergama;287 the app Luostarinmäki Adventure which also uses augmented reality to take “a visitor 
of the Luostarinmäki Handicrafts Museum in the middle of the 1850’s daily life in Turku”; 288 the 
app Anne’s Amsterdam which works in conjunction with the Anne Frank House museum.289
To conclude: This thesis presented the first step in an effort to arrive at a comprehensive under-
standing of the mediation of historical interpretation to a non-scholarly audience. Approaches 
with the same or similar goals had been made from different practical and theoretical starting  
points. Although it can never be scientifically exact, this thesis attempted to create a solid founda-
tion from which one can proceed towards the stated goal. Some expedient steps of the process 
have been proposed in this discussion. My hope is that this thesis’ focus on the relation between 
the past and human psychology and cognition on the one hand, and recently emergent possibili-
ties of medial configurations on the other, will also prove fruitful to connect, or at best unify, the  
other work that has already been done in this field.
285 Jeater 2012
286 Eve et. al. 2014
287 Architosh 2013
288 Future Technologies - University of Turku 2014
289 Anne Frank Stichting 2012
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